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SUMMARY 
The protection and resilience of critical infrastructure systems (CIS) are essential 
for public safety in daily operations and times of crisis and for community preparedness to 
hazard events. Situational awareness of CIS is key for prioritization and decision-making 
regarding repairs, maintenance, and emergency response. Increasing situational awareness 
and resilience of CIS includes both comprehensive monitoring of CIS and their 
surroundings, as well as evaluating CIS behaviors in changing conditions and with different 
system configurations. This is a significant challenge given that CIS are distributed over 
large geographic areas, often lack continuously available data for monitoring system states, 
and have complex interdependencies between system components and across different 
systems. This work addresses these factors to enhance CIS resilience. 
First, two frameworks for increasing the monitoring capabilities of CIS and their 
surrounding communities are presented. The proposed frameworks are (1) a process for 
analyzing and classifying social media big data for monitoring CIS and hazard events that 
impact CIS and (2) a framework for integrating heterogeneous data sources, including 
social media data, using Bayesian inference to update prior probabilities of event 
occurrence as new information is collected. Applications of both frameworks are presented, 
including building and evaluating text-based machine learning classifiers for identifying 
CIS damages and integrating stream gage data from the United States Geological Survey 
and Twitter data to estimate flood risks in Louisiana and CIS component damage (i.e., 
roadway flooding) in Atlanta, Georgia.  
 xv
Finally, probabilistic analyses of CIS vulnerabilities with varying system 
parameters and topologies are presented. In a single water network, the impact of varying 
parameters on component performance throughout the system is evaluated. In multiple, 
small-size water networks, the impacts of system topology and supply-to-distribution 
component connectivity are assessed to identify characteristics of more resilient networks. 
Each of these analyses is conducted with a Bayesian network model that represents 
interdependent CIS.  
This body of work contributes insights and methods for monitoring CIS and their 
surroundings and for assessing CIS performance. Specifically, integrating disparate data 
sources, including nontraditional sources that account for public perceptions, increases 
situational awareness of CIS, especially during or after failure events, and evaluating the 
sensitivity of CIS outcomes to changes in the network facilitates decisions for 
infrastructure planning and investments and for emergency response.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Critical infrastructure systems (CIS) are the lifelines of modern society, providing 
services and commodities such as transportation, communication, water, and power to 
communities for daily functions. The resilience of these systems is necessary to ensure 
public health and safety, societal efficiency, and economic growth. The United States 
federal government recognizes 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including transportation, 
water and wastewater, energy, emergency services, and communications and underscores 
the need to take a holistic approach in securing these complex systems (White House 2013, 
PPD-21). This Presidential Directive calls for the strengthening of CIS resilience, so that 
CIS are “able to withstand and recover rapidly from all hazards,” which will “require 
integration with the national preparedness system across prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery.” This is a monumental task further compounded by aging and 
evolving systems and dynamically changing environments. Civil infrastructures in 
particular are deteriorating from lack of maintenance and financial investment (ASCE 
2016). Many components are at or past the end of their design lives, yet they are expected 
to accommodate rapidly growing populations, uncertain effects from climate change, and 
increasing interdependencies across systems with continually advancing technologies 
(Ouyang 2014; Saini and Tien 2018).  
Moreover, CIS face risks from a range of hazards that may occur in quick 
succession, impeding system and community recovery and resilience efforts.  Hurricane 
Maria in 2017 wreaked havoc on CIS across Puerto Rico, causing widespread power 
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outages and damaged roadways, and a series of earthquake events in January 2020 created 
still more damage for communities that had not fully recovered from the hurricane event 
(Brakkton 2020). Hurricanes Harvey and Irma in 2017 also caused CIS damages and 
flooding across large portions of the southeastern United States (FEMA 2018). In the 
Tohoku 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami, buildings collapsed, portions of roadway 
and railway networks were destroyed, power and water supplies experienced long-term 
interruptions, and interdependencies between systems caused a nuclear disaster 
(Krishnamurthy et al. 2016; Lekkas et al. 2012). Meteorological hazards such as hurricanes 
have been increasing in intensity and frequency in recent years and have severe impacts on 
CIS and their surrounding communities (Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012), and these 
changing conditions must be considered in conjunction with other natural and manmade 
hazards that impact CIS.  
Terrorist attacks and manmade hazards can have similar effects on CIS as from 
natural hazards.  For instance, in 2017, an accidental fire caused an otherwise structurally 
sound section of Interstate 85 in Atlanta, Georgia to collapse. Approximately 220,000 
vehicles a day depend on the collapsed section that was closed for six weeks (Twumasi-
Boakye and Sobanjo 2018). Overall, damaging events affecting CIS can vary greatly in 
terms of predictability, intensity, and resulting consequences, and all potential impacts 
must be considered in CIS protection and resilience. 
Optimal situational awareness of CIS is key for prioritization and decision-making 
regarding CIS repairs, maintenance, and emergency management, and enhancing 
situational awareness of CIS increases their resilience (i.e., their ability to provide 
continuous services and adapt in the wake of long-term stressors and short-term shocks). 
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A community’s situational awareness is its ability to collect and synthesize available 
information to gain a holistic understanding of its surroundings (Ireson 2009; Vieweg et 
al. 2008). For improving the resilience of interdependent CIS, this means understanding 
the current state of system components and their interactions within and across systems 
during normal operations and any hazard events. Obtaining situational awareness includes 
comprehensive monitoring of systems and environmental conditions, as well as 
understanding system interdependencies and behaviors in a variety of performance 
scenarios.  
There are many challenges and limitations in enhancing the situational awareness 
and ultimately, resilience of these complex and continually evolving systems. The work in 
this dissertation focuses on addressing two specific challenges: (1) the lack of data 
availability for monitoring CIS in real-time and (2) the need to evaluate the impacts of 
network parameters and connectivity on overall vulnerability, a key facet of CIS resilience.  
Full, continuous monitoring of system states and interactions is often not available 
because CIS are highly distributed over large geographic areas. While physical sensors for 
monitoring the natural and built environments have increased capabilities as their 
technologies advance, they lack widespread deployment in all communities and where 
deployed, are often homogeneous and measure only a single condition or parameter (Rawat 
et al. 2014). This lack of information and data integration across varying conditions hinders 
comprehensive, real-time analyses of CIS and their interdependencies (Rinaldi 2004; 
Eusgeld et al. 2011).  
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At the same time, the rise of the web and social media has unlocked opportunities 
for gathering large amounts of information, observations, and opinions from the crowd in 
real time. Recent research has investigated the use of these nontraditional data sources to 
detect disaster events and CIS damages, e.g., Tien et al. (2016), Musaev et al. (2015), 
Vieweg et al. (2010), and Yin et al. (2012). Big data from social media is inherently noisy 
and unreliable, so discerning useful information from it can be difficult, but it has potential 
to supplement information from traditional data sources. To use heterogeneous data 
sources for monitoring CIS and their surroundings, the unique challenges associated with 
data analysis for each source must be considered.  
This dissertation proposes two frameworks for using heterogeneous data sources, 
including nontraditional sources such as social media data, for monitoring CIS and their 
surroundings. The first is a framework for processing and classifying social media big data 
to identify CIS damages in real-time. As an application, the framework is used to build and 
evaluate three well-known machine learning classifiers for identifying transportation and 
power system damages in text-based Twitter data. The three classifiers compared are 
support vector machines, naïve Bayes models, and decision trees. In addition to evaluating 
the classifiers on manually labeled test data, the highest performing classifier is evaluated 
on a set of unlabeled data from a specific event (i.e., Tropical Storm Irma in Atlanta) to 
simulate a real-time detection scenario.  
The second framework is for probabilistically integrating data from multiple and 
varied sensor types to estimate disaster and failure events. Such integration can improve 
situational awareness by providing more comprehensive and up-to-date evaluations of a 
community’s surroundings than an individual sensor type alone. The framework uses 
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Bayesian updating to infer updated probabilities of event occurrence from assumed or 
computed prior probabilities. The result is a posterior event probability given collected 
data. Bayesian updating is a method for data fusion across multiple sensors, especially in 
the field of robotics (Durrant-Whyte and Henderson 2008). The novelty of the proposed 
approach is in its considerations and updating of prior understandings of risk, and in 
integrating likelihoods of observing datapoints within individual sensor networks first 
before integrating that information across unrelated sensor types to monitor a community 
condition or event. This approach enables the framework to account for uncertainties in 
system states and be applicable across events. It captures information specific to each data 
type, calculating specific sensor source likelihoods to account for data heterogeneity, 
before combining information from all sources. The framework supports real-time and 
dynamic updating of estimated risks of an event as different data is observed and more data 
becomes available. To explicate the framework’s use, it is applied to estimate flood risks 
in Louisiana during August 2016, and results are assessed compared to the true flood events 
that occurred during the time period of analysis. The framework is also applied to estimate 
the risk of transportation damage (i.e., blocked roadways) during Tropical Storm Irma in 
Atlanta, Georgia. This application is provided to illustrate the framework’s potential for 
updating inputs for CIS models. 
In conjunction with increasing monitoring capabilities, it is important to understand 
the impacts of CIS network parameters and topology on system vulnerabilities and 
behaviors. Network parameters and topology change when components are damaged in 
hazard events or when actions are taken to strengthen and improve CIS in attempts to 
increase resilience. Quantifying the impacts of different network characteristics on CIS 
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behaviors enables the evaluation and prioritization of various actions to repair, retrofit, or 
build out new parts of an infrastructure system. CIS characteristics include component-
specific attributes such as capacity and asset robustness and system-level attributes such as 
network topology and connectivity. Given the complexities of CIS, including their 
interdependencies and the range of potential changes to network parameters that can impact 
system behavior, there is the need to determine the sensitivity of system performance to 
those different parameters. That is, what changes to network parameters have the greatest 
impact on system behavior and overall resilience? 
This portion of the dissertation investigates the effects varying of three network 
parameters on CIS vulnerability and resilience: component probabilities of failure, supply 
redundancies, and system connectivity. The parameters are varied in a single system, and 
each of these correspond with a decision a stakeholder might make regarding infrastructure 
investments to increase resilience, i.e., retrofitting components to better withstand a hazard, 
adding supply redundancies to the system, and building out new parts of the system. The 
effects of weakened system components, i.e., damaged components with increased 
probabilities of failure, are also evaluated. Outcomes are evaluated by comparing 
component state functionality under these varying conditions across component 
characteristics and populations affected in failure scenarios.  Moreover, since CIS can have 
a wide variety of topologies that affect the paths through which supply components can 
reach non-supply components in a network, a series of analyses is conducted across 
multiple, small-size water networks. The overall vulnerabilities of the systems are 
compared according to their supply-to-distribution component connectivity and other 
graph theory metrics. To obtain the probabilistic outcomes of system performance under 
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varying parameters and across multiple system layouts, a Bayesian network (BN) model is 
used.  
1.2 Dissertation Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a background of the current body of work for areas related to the 
use of nontraditional data sources for CIS monitoring, data integration methodologies, and 
analyses of CIS in changing conditions. Specifically, related work on the use of social 
media big data for monitoring critical infrastructures and hazard events in conjunction with 
traditional data sources is presented, along with related work in evaluating CIS 
performance and resilience. This chapter also describes in detail the Bayesian network 
model used in this dissertation for probabilistic analyses of CIS performance.   
Chapter 3 describes a new framework for processing and classifying social media 
big data for use in monitoring CIS components, from initial download to the development 
of supervised-learning models to identify specific, real-time CIS damages. The proposed 
framework focuses on text-based social media data. 
Chapter 4 describes a new framework for probabilistically integrating 
heterogeneous data sources to monitor a single condition or event. Heterogeneous data 
sources include both physical and social sensor data. 
Chapter 5 presents application examples for both of the proposed frameworks. 
First, three text-based machine learning classifiers are built and evaluated for identifying 
CIS damages in two systems through the proposed framework for processing social media 
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data. Specifically, the classifiers are built to identify damages in transportation and power 
systems. A detailed comparison and analysis of the classifiers’ performance and 
generalizability is presented, including an evaluation of one of the classifiers on unlabeled 
data to simulate a real-time detection scenario. Second, the proposed data integration 
framework is used to estimate flood risk in Louisiana in August 2016 using two disparate 
data sources, including a social media sensor and a physical sensor. Third, the proposed 
data integration framework is used to estimate the risk of damage to a transportation system 
component (i.e., a blocked roadway) during Tropical Storm Irma in Atlanta, Georgia.  
Chapter 6 analyzes the impacts of the parameters and topology of a single CIS with 
interdependencies across other system components and the impacts of topology on overall 
network vulnerability in multiple, small-size water networks. The Bayesian network model 
described in Chapter 2 is used for each of these analyses.   
Chapter 7 discusses opportunities for extending and continuing the work in this 




CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction  
 This chapter presents a background of related work in monitoring CIS components 
and their surroundings and evaluating CIS network parameters and their impact on the 
overall behaviors of CIS. Areas where previous work can be built upon and new work is 
needed for increasing situational awareness and resilience of interdependent CIS is 
discussed. For monitoring CIS and their surroundings, different data sources, including the 
emergence of social media as a nontraditional data source, and current data integration 
methods are discussed. For evaluating CIS network parameters, current analyses of CIS 
performance with uncertain parameters, various topologies, and actions implemented to 
increase resilience are presented and discussed. 
2.2 Data Availability and Heterogeneity for Monitoring Critical Infrastructures 
 Increasing the resilience of CIS is a global challenge (Amin 2002), with 
infrastructure performance recognized as a critical contributor to overall community 
resilience (Johansen et al. 2017). Monitoring CIS components in day-to-day operations and 
in times of crisis is important to obtain situational awareness for the sustainability, 
protection, and response of CIS and the communities they serve in today’s rapidly changing 
world. Elements of CIS and their surroundings – both of the natural and built environments 
– can be difficult to estimate given uncertainties in hazards, responses, and impacts, and 
with continuous evolution in time.  
 A variety of tools are available, depending on the type of infrastructure, to monitor 
CIS and detect damages. Within these tools are many different physical sensors available 
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for monitoring conditions in the built and natural environments. For example, strain gages 
and accelerometers provide data to detect anomalies in structural health monitoring 
applications (Lynch and Loh 2006), and air quality and meteorological sensors collect data 
on atmospheric conditions. For power systems, smart grids detect and isolate power 
outages (U.S. Department of Energy 2019). These physical sensors can provide real-time 
data for system analyses. They do not, however, identify sources of damage, assess 
damages to other components and systems caused by the same source, or measure the 
impact of infrastructure damages on local communities. 
 Smart city initiatives are pushing forward the need for open data availability and 
more connected wireless sensor networks, e.g., Chicago’s Array of Things (Mone 2015), 
to increase resilience, but new information and communication technologies are slow to 
implement uniformly across entire communities (Neirotti et al. 2014; Alawadhi et al. 
2012). Furthermore, most interconnected sensor networks still lack heterogeneity to collect 
multiple types of data and require single or similar sensor types (Miorandi et al. 2012).  
 Large-scale deployment of physical sensor networks must also consider sensor size, 
cost, and configuration, and may be slow or impractical to implement depending on the 
application, limiting the availability of physical sensor data within a community (Rawat et 
al. 2014). Physical sensor networks for structural health monitoring are often designed to 
monitor single civil structures, as seen in studies such as Hackmann et al. (2014) and 
Pakzad et al. (2008), rather than groups of structures over larger distributed areas. Single 
physical sensor types alone are thus limited in the information they can reveal about 
community conditions affecting infrastructure and people.  
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 Other methods for infrastructure damage assessment include image-based 
approaches such as satellite imagery processing (Chen and Hutchinson 2007), laser image 
processing (Tsai and Chatterjee 2018), and image-based three-dimensional reconstruction 
(Zhou et al. 2015). Despite new technologies and initiatives, CIS still lack comprehensive, 
integrated, and continuous monitoring and damage detection across systems.  
2.3 Social Media as a Data Source 
 Social media users offer a new type of sensor – social sensors – which takes 
advantage of the constant information stream present today. Social sensors can fill in gaps 
of information about infrastructure or environmental conditions where physical sensors are 
not deployed or do not exist. Social media data is valuable for gathering large amounts of 
real-time information from the public for event detection, situational evaluation, or 
sentiment analysis and can enhance situational awareness in disaster events (Kankanamge 
et al. 2019).  
 Research has been conducted using social sensors to examine community responses 
to manmade events such as mass shootings (Vieweg et al. 2008) and to detect critical 
infrastructure failures (Tien et al. 2016) and natural disasters such as earthquakes and 
landslides (Sakaki et al. 2010; Musaev et al. 2015). Other works have also investigated the 
use of social media for monitoring environmental conditions (Boddula et al. 2016), 
monitoring urban environments and populations (Klotz et al. 2017), and mapping human 
mobility (Wang and Taylor 2015). These studies have shown that, in addition to providing 
information on conditions of the built and natural environments, social media can provide 
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data that physical sensors cannot measure, such as information about societal conditions or 
public perception regarding major events. 
 Social sensor data collection and analysis present their own set of challenges. Data 
from social sensors is noisy and unreliable, containing rumors or misinformation that are 
both intentional and unintentional (Alexander 2014; Zhang et al. 2019). The majority of 
users do not share their locations (Leetaru et al. 2013). For instance, less than 1% of data 
streamed from one social media platform, Twitter, contains geotagged information (Martin 
et al. 2020). This makes it difficult to determine event locations and whether or not the user 
is truly observing the event of interest and reduces the amount of useful information that 
can be extracted from social sensors. Moreover, for social sensors to provide significant 
new information, specific topics need to garner enough attention from the crowd. While 
many physical sensors can provide continuous or near-continuous data, social sensors may 
vary in the amount of information provided on a topic at any given time.   
 In this dissertation, the focus is on identifying information relevant to infrastructure 
damage in text-based social media data. The benefit of using text-based social media data 
instead of image data is that large quantities of the former are available in real-time, 
including as potential hazard events occur. While most social media platforms also allow 
multimedia attachments in user posts, the focus on text-based data in this dissertation is to 
easily include a broad range of damage detection for multiple systems and to support 
extensibility to other data sources.  
 Next, previous approaches to categorize the texts of social media posts for event 
detection, and more specifically, CIS damage identification are described. These include 
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methods for filtering posts for keywords or hashtags related to disaster and damage events, 
crowdsourcing to label and categorize posts, and a variety of supervised and unsupervised 
machine learning models. To improve existing models and approaches for extracting 
information about CIS from social media data, there is the need to identify specific 
damages, rather than generally assessing damages in a disaster. The approach described in 
this dissertation identifies current and ongoing damages according to definitions that are 
not specific to a single disaster event. In this dissertation, the generalizability of specific 
classification models is also evaluated in a real-time monitoring scenario, which is also 
absent from analyses of previous approaches (Zhang et al. 2019). 
 The following studies identify hazard events and CIS damages through filtering and 
manual labeling methods. De Albuquerque et al. (2015) filter tweets based on keywords, 
manually inspecting and labeling tweets as relevant or irrelevant to flood events, then 
categorize relevant tweets into subgroups, e.g., tweets relating to traffic conditions or 
infrastructure damage during a flood event. This manual classification, however, is 
inefficient and cannot be used to increase situational awareness because large amounts of 
relevant information cannot be identified in real-time. Smith et al. (2015) also use Twitter 
data to support flood risk management and select tweets based on a predetermined set of 
fifty-five key terms related to flood events. Filtering posts in this way does not consider 
other words or terms in a tweet that can change or specify its context and can disregard 
relevant tweets or include irrelevant tweets without further evaluation.  
 Tien et al. (2016) search Twitter data for posts specifically related to damages to 
bridges, highways, power systems, and gas lines. Tweets are collected with a keyword and 
stop word filtering process. However, the accuracy of the filtering is not evaluated. Yuan 
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and Liu (2018) determine the relevance of tweets to a specific disaster event to predict the 
likelihood of infrastructure damage. The tweets are again selected based on keywords 
pertaining to the specific hazard event investigated, and the method does not identify 
specific events from the tweets.  
 The following studies use machine learning classification models to predict hazard 
and damage events. This dissertation builds on these works to identify CIS damages 
regardless of the hazard event that caused them. Imran et al. (2013) use crowdsourcing 
tools to categorize tweets by whether or not they are informative, what type of information 
they provide, and the subtype of information they provide. While identifying types of 
tweets that are helpful during disaster events, the study does not show how well the model 
performs in classifying new sets of tweets not filtered by crowd workers prior to 
classification (i.e., in real-time monitoring).  
 Yin et al. (2012) use machine learning classifiers to identify information about 
critical infrastructures to improve emergency response. The classification is binary for 
whether or not a tweet contains information about disaster impact on infrastructures. While 
Yin et al. (2012) demonstrate the success of machine learning classifiers to detect 
infrastructure damages during an emergency event, the classifiers are trained and evaluated 
on a single dataset from the same event, the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and does not 
address generalizability. Similarly, Yuan and Liu (2020) use machine learning classifiers 
to analyze social media for damage assessment after Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Different 
models, including those presented in this dissertation (i.e., Naïve Bayes, support vector 
machine, and decision tree models), are compared, but the models are again trained and 
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evaluated for a specific hazard event. While a sentiment analysis of collected data is 
included in the results, the models do not identify damages for a specific CIS.  
 Musaev et al. (2015) use classifiers to predict the relevance or irrelevance of social 
media posts to landslides. To conduct real-time detection, posts referring to past or future 
time periods, i.e., those that contain years or months that do not match the evaluation 
period, are removed. The remaining posts, however, may still refer to noncurrent 
landslides. To increase situational awareness of CIS, the classification in this dissertation 
identifies posts referring to current or ongoing damages labeled as relevant depending on 
the presence of temporal words that provide context, e.g. “today,” “now,” “yesterday,” etc.   
 Pereira et al. (2017) use machine learning-based classifiers to identify 
transportation-related tweets. The classifiers are trained on manually labeled tweets and 
tested on a separate, random set of tweets that are not collected during any particular hazard 
or event. Non-travel-related tweets in the training set are selected randomly and then 
manually verified. Compared to the work in this dissertation, the classifiers do not identify 
specific CIS damages to support decisions to increase community resilience. 
 Finally, the following approaches use integrated machine learning methods for 
mapping disaster-related hazard and damage events identified from social media data. Fan, 
Jiang, and Mostafavi (2020) identify critical tweets related to CIS disruptions with a graph-
based approach and identified tweets are later combined with image and geographical data. 
The graph-based approach represents tweets as nodes and semantic similarities between 
the tweets as edges in a weighted graph. This approach identifies clusters of tweets related 
to CIS disruptions, but does not identify damages to a specific system. Fan, Wu, and 
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Mostafavi (2020) propose a “pipeline” for mapping events in social media data that also 
includes supervised and unsupervised learning algorithms. The classification models 
identify eight different classes related to disaster events. However, they do not focus on 
damages for a specific CIS. Compared to these studies, the approach proposed in this 
dissertation also integrates different methods for extracting useful information from social 
media data but focuses on identifying damage in specific CIS, rather than a general damage 
assessment. Moreover, the generalizability of models built in this dissertation are evaluated 
in a specific disaster event, but the approach is not specific to a single event and is tested 
on an event not part of the training dataset.  
2.4 Data Integration for Heterogeneous Sources 
 Due to the limitations and challenges in using both physical and social sensor 
sources for monitoring CIS and their surroundings, data from individual sensor networks 
alone may not truly describe the causes or impacts of a damaging event on a community. 
In this dissertation, the ability of data integrated from multiple sensor sources to enhance 
resulting analyses, event detection, and overall situational awareness is investigated. 
Recent studies show potential in integrating different sensor sources to detect hazard 
events. For example, Musaev et al. (2015) maps social media posts and data from physical 
sensor sources, including rainfall and earthquake data, to calculate the probability of 
detecting a landslide given a grid-based location. While this study and others, e.g., 
Jongman et al. (2015), use data from across sensor types, they do not provide a framework 
through which heterogeneous likelihoods of sensor observed data can be integrated to 
calculate a posterior probability of an event given that data. In addition, the data integration 
framework in this dissertation considers prior probabilities of event occurrence to account 
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for uncertainty in the disaster or failure events themselves. This enables the assessment of 
changing evaluations of risk as more data from different sources is collected 
2.5 Critical Infrastructure System Parameters and Analyses 
 In addition to improving monitoring capabilities, another aspect of ensuring CIS 
resilience is assessing the impact of network parameters, including topology, system 
redundancies, and interdependencies across different systems. In this study, assessments 
are conducted for parameter variations in a single network and for multiple networks with 
varying topologies and redundancies.  
 There is a large body of work focusing on the resilience assessment of infrastructure 
systems. For example, Reed et al. (2009) characterize the behavior of CIS under natural 
hazards, including resilience and interdependency measures. The focus is on electrical 
power and telecommunications systems. Attoh-Okine et al. (2009) develop a resilience 
index, focusing on an urban highway infrastructure system. Pant et al. (2014) focus on 
evaluating economic resilience of interdependent infrastructure, while Poljansek et al. 
(2012) and Guidotti et al. (2016) specifically investigate the role of system dependencies 
and interdependencies on infrastructure risk and resilience. Rather than assessing 
infrastructure resilience, however, the focus of the work in this dissertation is to evaluate 
and compare varying approaches to increase CIS resilience. The objective is not to provide 
particular assessments of CIS resilience. Instead, this study seeks to investigate what 
measures and actions can be taken to increase infrastructure resilience, with a focus on 
evaluating the impacts of varying network parameters on CIS resilience. 
 18
 CIS have a wide range of network topologies and component parameters depending 
on the types of infrastructure, surrounding environments, and communities they serve. 
Both system- and component-level network parameters affect CIS behaviors and resulting 
resilience. System-level parameters include connectivity between components and system 
redundancies. Component-level parameters include component capacities and probabilities 
of failure. Previous studies looking at the relationship between network parameters and 
resilience include Zhang et al. (2015), which looks at the effect of system topology 
measures on the resilience of transportation networks. The results from that study provide 
insights on the types of topologies that may be more resilient. However, the connectivity 
between specific components in the system (e.g., a critical node’s reachability to other 
components in the network) is not studied, nor is the effect of specific improvements to an 
infrastructure system.  
 In this study, the objective is to evaluate and compare the impacts of potential 
changes in a CIS on overall resilience and to investigate the effect of network topology, 
especially in regard to supply connectivity, on overall system vulnerability. In addition, 
while Zhang et al. (2015) focuses on topological measures for a single transportation 
system, this study includes a comparison of topological measures across multiple networks 
and an investigation of the impacts of component-level improvements and adding 
redundancies in multiple interdependent networks. 
 Genge et al. (2012) focus on communication and control logic implementation 
parameters that influence the outcome of attacks on industrial control systems. The study 
connects communication and control systems to look at the impact of network parameters 
on the effectiveness of potential cyberattacks. Rather than looking at control logic-based 
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parameters as in Genge et al. (2012), the focus in this study is on physical CIS parameters 
that influence system outcomes. The parameters investigated in this study include physical 
improvements to CIS, specifically repairing or retrofitting components and building new 
parts of the system such as additional backups or links. In addition, in Genge et al. (2012), 
a simulator is used and results aggregated across runs of the simulation for each set of 
parameters. In contrast, the analyses presented in this study are based on a series of 
probabilistic inferences conducted over a network, resulting in a probabilistic assessment 
of CIS behaviors (i.e., component vulnerabilities). 
 Focusing on physical improvements to CIS, previous work includes Ouyang et al. 
(2012), which quantifies the impacts of improvements at different stages on resilience. The 
effect of varying ordering of actions is investigated. In contrast to that work, the scenario 
of interest in this dissertation is a decision that is to be made at a point in time, where the 
need is to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of varying actions to increase resilience. 
The objective is to provide information that facilitates prioritization of infrastructure 
resources for a given action based on the quantified impacts on CIS outcomes. In addition, 
the focus in Ouyang et al. (2012) is on a single infrastructure system of the power 
transmission grid, while this study includes interdependencies across multiple CIS. 
 Panteli and Pierluigi (2017) also focus on a single infrastructure system, electrical 
power, to evaluate the resilience of electrical power infrastructure to extreme weather 
events. The effects of constructing more robust lines and towers and adding parallel lines 
are considered. The study measures impacts by overall network loss of load frequency and 
loss of load expectation. Compared to that study, the work in this dissertation measures 
impacts at the individual distribution component level, providing a more granular 
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assessment of impacts. The granular approach in this study provides a detailed measure of 
the impacts of varying network parameters and leads to insights on predicting component-
level impacts based on specific component characteristics. In addition, rather than the four 
specific case studies considered in Panteli and Pierluigi (2017), this study compares system 
performance across a range of component states and parameter values. The analyses in 
Panteli and Pierluigi (2017) are also specific to a high wind load hazard, while this study 
looks at how parameter variations in interdependent CIS affect performance regardless of 
hazard type. 
 Interdependent CIS are considered in Duenas-Osorio et al. (2006), which includes 
investigation of the effect of mitigation actions on increasing functionality. The study 
considers the addition of bypasses or alternative routes around congested nodes, with 
actions selected based on congestion in flow to create new edges. This action most closely 
relates to the link configuration parameter investigated in this study. However, the actions 
investigated in this study are based on failure scenarios rather than congestion. In addition, 
effects in Duenas-Osorio et al. (2006) are measured by overall network connectivity loss. 
In contrast, this study evaluates network impacts based on the effects at individual 
distribution components. The component-level approach in this study provides analysis 
results in terms of specific service location disruptions under varying scenarios. In addition, 
the evaluation of impacts as a function of different component characteristic enables future 
performance-based system designs that seek to target specific levels of performance for 
particular components.  
2.6 A Bayesian Network Model for Critical Infrastructure Systems 
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 To assess the impacts of network parameter changes and evaluate the performance 
of CIS under varying scenarios, inferences in this study are conducted over a Bayesian 
network (BN)-based model of CIS. A BN is an acyclic directed graph in which nodes 
represent random variables and edges represent the probabilistic dependencies between 
nodes (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). The nodes and edges of a BN are defined by conditional 
probability tables (CPTs), which give the probabilities of nodes being in varying states 
conditioned on the states of their parents. The CIS BN modeling approach is suitable for 
the work in this dissertation to evaluate the impacts of varying network parameters and 
different network connectivities on CIS performance because many successive inferences 
can easily be conducted over a range of parameters and parameter values. In the BN, CIS 
components are nodes, and connections between components within a CIS and 
interdependencies across CIS are edges. A binary representation of CIS, where nodes are 
in survival or failure states, is considered. The CPT of each component contains the 
probabilities of failure of the component given the states of its parents, including the 
occurrence of a hazard.  
 Three comprehensive types of interdependencies are included in the model. Service 
provision interdependencies occur when a CIS component depends on the outputs of 
another component in a different system to operate. These are modeled as direct 
dependencies in the BN. Geographic interdependencies occur when components are 
collocated and thus subject to the same hazard risks. These are modeled with common 
hazard node parents across components. Access for repair interdependencies occur when a 
damaged component depends on access from another component for repair operations. 
These are modeled by tracking component states over time and defining dependencies on 
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access nodes in the BN. This last type of interdependency occurs in post-disaster situations 
when a component failure has been identified, and its inclusion in the model allows for the 
analysis of recovery efforts and downtimes (Johansen and Tien 2018). The model 
distinguishes the functionality of two types of components in the main CIS: supply 
components (e.g., water treatment facilities) and distribution components. Supplies provide 
the infrastructure resource to distribution components through minimum link sets (MLSs), 
which are minimum sets of components that link from a supply to a distribution component 
and will disconnect if any link is removed. A distribution component is defined as any non-
supply component. With the nodes defined, the interdependent CIS BN model is 
constructed and exact inferences are conducted over the network using the algorithms 
described in Applegate and Tien (2019).  
 To assess the impacts of varying network parameters on CIS outcomes in this study, 
inferences are run for each value in the range of parameter values of interest. The inferences 
are easily conducted within the BN framework. For the network parameters evaluated, 
component probabilities of failure are efficiently varied at the nodes, system redundancies 
are added as additional nodes in the model, and changes in network connectivity and 
structure are made through altering the edges of the model. These variations are described 
in more detail in Chapter 6. For general CIS, component locations and additional 
dependencies can be altered as well. The inferences result in component marginal failure 
probabilities or conditional failure probabilities based on evidence, such as observed states 
of component or hazard nodes representing failure or hazard scenarios of interest. 
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK FOR PROCESSING AND 
CLASSIFYING SOCIAL MEDIA DATA FOR CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE MONITORING 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the proposed framework for processing and classifying 
social media big data for CIS monitoring and enhanced situational awareness. Including 
social media data in obtaining situational awareness for CIS provides information 
regarding public perception, which is essential for overall community resilience. An 
application of this framework is presented in Chapter 5. The application is to build and 
evaluate different supervised learning classifiers to identify transportation and power 
system damages. To further evaluate the generalizability of a classifier built in the 
application, a second example and analysis is provided that simulates use of the classifier 
for a real-time CIS damage detection during a hazard event.  
3.2 Objectives and Data Collection 
 This study aims to address several major challenges in efficiently and accurately 
identifying relevant information in social media text data to assess the state of critical 
infrastructures for increased situational awareness. The objective is to provide guidance for 
building text-based machine learning classifiers to increase the availability of data for 
monitoring CIS and their surroundings. Applications of the framework result in (1) training 
and testing sets of labeled social media text data, (2) machine learning-based classifiers 
that automate the identification of current or ongoing damages for different infrastructure 
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systems in social media posts, and (3) evaluations of those classifiers’ performance and 
generalizability.  
 To begin the framework, the user must have a database of texts downloaded or 
streamed from social media platforms. These can include tweets from Twitter, Instagram 
captions, status updates from Facebook, and more. Each individual post is considered a 
datapoint. This study focuses on classification based on the words in each post alone; 
however, the user’s database can also include additional attributes for each post, such as 
date, social media platform, and author. Text data from social media platforms can often 
be streamed based on search or filter terms (e.g., hashtags). With this in mind, the goal in 
creating the database is to include datapoints referring to different events and locations 
while still containing terms referring to critical infrastructures. This creates more 
comprehensive training and testing sets such that the models are able to generalize to 
identifying damages in unlabeled data.  
3.3 Proposed Framework 
The proposed framework for processing and classifying social media big data 
begins with the development of training and testing sets. The classification task is to 
identify CIS damage in a social media post, and a different classifier must be built for each 
system of interest. For the purposes of increasing situational awareness, only posts that 
refer to a current or ongoing event or system damage state should be considered as relevant 
information in each post. Ensuring that posts provide information on current, real-time 
states supports immediate decision-making to increase community resilience, e.g., what 
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areas need resources or where to send repair crews. Each classifier must have specific 
definitions of the damages being identified for each system.  
To develop the training and testing sets, datapoints must be manually labeled 
according to definitions of damage for each system. A single datapoint may appear in a 
training or testing set for multiple systems. The classification of system damage for a post 
can be binary or multinomial. While separate classifiers can be constructed to predict 
individual types of damages within a system, this framework assumes the classifiers are 
constructed to predict all damages for an individual CIS type, e.g., all damages in a power 
system. 
As previously described, the database of social media text data for constructing the 
training and testing sets should contain a variety of infrastructure-related words and 
reference multiple events and locations. To label tweets according to damage definition, 
the database is first searched for datapoints containing specific keywords and terms related 
to damages in each system and the events or conditions that cause them. The resulting data 
is a reduced set that can be manually assessed and labeled according to the damage state 
definitions set by the user.  
Once each datapoint is labeled according to damage in a system, it can be split into 
individual words for classification. From here, if a datapoint contains attributes not useful 
for classification, it is removed from the training or testing data. In this study, symbols, 
pronouns, and articles are removed from the text data before classification. Likewise, if a 
datapoint does not contain a “necessary keyword” or contains a “stop word,” it is thrown 
out of the training and testing data. A “necessary keyword” is defined as a word or term 
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that must be an attribute of a post (i.e., datapoint) for that post to be included in the training 
and testing data for a classifier. A “stop word” cannot be an attribute of a post if that post 
is to be included in the training and testing data for a classifier. These words will change 
depending on the classification task and definitions of damage states, and this filtering 
serves as an additional measure to limit the data for classification by removing noise. For 
instance, for classifying damage in a power system, the word “outage” may be included as 
a necessary keyword, and the word “money” may be a stop word. A datapoint without the 
word “outage” or including the word “money” is assumed to be noise. The remaining 
manually labeled data for classification contains attributes that filtering alone cannot 
identify according to defined damage states. 
The filtering stage is similar to previous works described in Chapter 2 that use 
keyword searches and filters to identify CIS information in social media data. The purpose 
of classification and evaluation after the filtering stage is to predict damage states with a 
combination of attributes, i.e., words in a post. To ensure suitable sizes for the training and 
testing datasets, additional datapoints can be searched and manually labeled from the 
database if a significant amount of datapoints are removed during the filtering process.  
Constructing classifiers with the training data is open-ended and depends on the 
application. For instance, some models are not suitable for multinomial classification. In 
the application presented in 5.2, three different classifiers are built for two different 
classification tasks, and the models’ performance is compared. Regardless of the model, 
hyperparameters should be adjusted using cross-validation to avoid overfitting.  
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Finally, classifiers constructed through the framework can be evaluated for 
generalizability on the testing data and other unlabeled data. Typical measures for 
evaluating machine learning-based classifiers are overall accuracy, precision, and recall. 
These measures are calculated from the numbers of datapoints correctly and incorrectly 
classified by the built model on training data, testing data, or through cross-validation. The 
number of correctly classified datapoints for a particular damage state is the number of true 
positives, 𝑇𝑃, and the number of false positives for a state is 𝐹𝑃. The number of datapoints 
incorrectly classified for a class is 𝐹𝑁, i.e., the number of datapoints that are labeled as one 
state but falsely classified as another.  
Overall accuracy is the number of correctly classified datapoints out of the total 
number of datapoints. Precision, 𝑃, is calculated as the number of tweets predicted 
correctly in a class, or true positives, out of the total number of tweets the classifier predicts 
in that class, both correctly and incorrectly (i.e., 𝑇𝑃 𝐹𝑃), as given in Equation (1). Recall 
or true positive rate, 𝑅, is calculated as the number of tweets predicted correctly in a class 
out of the total number of tweets truly in that class, 𝑇𝑃 𝐹𝑁, as given in Equation (2).  
𝑃
 
  (1) 
𝑅    (2) 
3.4 Step-by-Step Summary 
The steps of the proposed data processing and classification framework are 
summarized below: 
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1. Define damage states for the CIS of interest. 
2. Search available database for initial keywords and terms related to the CIS of 
interest. 
3. Manually label posts for relevance to each damage state for system of interest. 
4. Identify individual words as the attributes of each datapoint for classification. 
5. Filter out symbols, pronouns, and articles. 
6. Remove datapoints whose attributes do not include necessary keywords or 
include stop words. 
7. Separate the labeled and filtered datapoints into training and testing sets, 
based on user-defined training and testing ratios. 
8. Train classifiers and tune hyperparameters with cross-validation data. 
9. Evaluate classifiers on testing data and other unlabeled data, depending on the 
application.  
 Figure 1 shows a schematic of the full process of the framework, with steps for 
training and test set development grouped separately from classification and evaluation 
steps. The entire framework provides a clear progression to reduce social media big data 
to relevant information for CIS monitoring and real-time decision-making. The filtering 
process and identification of current and ongoing damages to develop the training and 
testing sets before classification reduces the amount of data for classification.  
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Figure 1. Flowchart for development of text-based classifiers for CIS monitoring 
 
To use any classifiers built from this framework for real-time processing of social 
media text data, the data must be filtered in the same way as the training and testing set 
data. An application example of a real-time detection scenario is provided in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4. FRAMEWORK FOR DATA INTEGRATION OF 
HETEROGENEOUS SOURCES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the proposed framework for probabilistically integrating 
data from multiple, heterogeneous sources in a single time frame. The approach uses 
Bayesian inference to update prior understandings of risk with new information, as it is 
collected and can be applied to estimate a variety of events, including CIS damage and 
hazard event occurrence. In this chapter, definitions and variables used in the framework 
are first provided, followed by a detailed description of the proposed framework. This data 
integration framework is then summarized in a step-by-step list, and the process for 
extending the framework to include additional time periods is described. Two applications 
of this data integration framework are presented in Chapter 5.   
4.2 Variables and Definitions 
For the remainder of this chapter and in Chapter 5, the term “sensor source” is used 
to describe each type of sensor measuring a unique parameter, whether physical, social, or 
other, and “sensor network” is used to describe a group of sensors from the same source. 
In the proposed framework, data from sensors within one network is integrated first, and 
then data from across different sources is integrated. Let 𝜃 represent the occurrence of a 
disaster or failure event at a specified location or affecting a particular system component, 
and let 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠  each represent data from a different sensor source, for 𝑘 total sources. 
The prior probability of 𝜃 is denoted 𝑃 𝜃 , with the prior probability of nonoccurrence of 
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the event equal to 1 𝑃 𝜃 .  The framework is applicable for systems or events with 
multiple states, as long as the states are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 𝜃 
is defined as the occurrence of the primary event of interest to be detected, 𝑃 𝜃  as the 
assessment to be updated, and ?̅? as the nonoccurrence of 𝜃. Prior probabilities of 𝜃 can be 
based on historical data, physics-based analyses, previously updated probability 
distributions, expert judgment, or a combination of the above. These represent a current 
understanding of risk for the event of interest.  
4.3 Proposed Framework 
To update prior probabilities, appropriate data sources, 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , must be 
identified that indicate 𝜃. As no data collection is perfect, these sources indicate 𝜃 with 
some uncertainty. In the proposed approach, the data sources can be physical sensors, 
social sensors, a combination of the two, or others, and sensors that collect data 
continuously or provide information only at specific points in time. The data integration 
across sources, 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , is ultimately performed through Bayesian updating. Bayesian 
updating for data fusion combines data from sensors or experiments with prior probabilities 
of event occurrence to compute posterior occurrence probabilities (Khaleghi et al. 2013). 
The resulting posterior probabilities from the analysis are the conditional probabilities of 
events given observed data from the combined sources. Bayesian updating of 𝜃 using this 
data is shown in Equation (3).  
𝑃 𝜃|𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , ,…, |
, ,…,
  (3) 
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From Equation (1), 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |𝜃  is the joint conditional probability of 
observing data from all sensor sources for updating given event occurrence, representing 
the likelihood of all sources, and 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠  is the joint probability of observing data 
from all sources. The resulting posterior probability, 𝑃 𝜃|𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , is the probability 
of event occurrence given observed data from different data sources.  
Calculating the likelihood of all sources and the joint probability of all data requires 
several intermediary calculations. First, the integrated likelihood of data given 𝜃 from each 
individual network, 𝑃 𝑠 |𝜃 , must be calculated, where 𝑠  represents the 𝑖  data source 
out of 𝑘, by combining the observations indicating 𝜃 within each network. These 
calculations are dependent on the specific application of interest, the nature of the data, any 
possible relationships between the data (including dependence or independence of 
observations within a network), and the accuracy or reliability of each source. The observed 
data from each source must correspond in terms of date, time, and/or location to the event 
of interest. Out of the sources considered, the number of sources 𝑘 available for updating 
may vary in time. For instance, if on a day, only one of the considered sources provides 
data indicating 𝜃, then 𝑘 1, and 𝑘 is subject to change the following day. The application 
example in Chapter 5 demonstrates how these calculations can be performed for two 
specific data sources. The calculations of 𝑃 𝑠 |𝜃  are intentionally left open and flexible 
so that the framework can be applied to different sensor sources outputting varying types 
of data with varying likelihood calculations for 𝜃.  
The next step of the proposed framework is to compute the joint likelihood of 
observing data from all sources, 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |𝜃 , from the integrated likelihoods of data 
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within individual networks. The joint likelihood calculations are based on the assumption 
that individual source likelihoods are independent of each other when conditioned on the 
same event, location, or system component of interest, i.e., likelihoods are conditionally 
independent given 𝜃. From this, the joint likelihoods are computed as the products of the 
individual source likelihoods for each event state, as in Equation (4).  
𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |𝜃  ∏ 𝑃 𝑠 |𝜃   (4) 
The proposed framework next requires calculation of the joint probability of 
observing data from all sources, 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , using the total probability of data. This is 
possible because all states of the event are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 
Equation (5) shows this calculation for two states of the event, 𝜃 and ?̅?, i.e., occurred and 
not occurred. 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |𝜃  is previously calculated from Equation (4). The likelihood 
of data for the nonoccurrence of 𝜃, 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |?̅? , is computed in the same way, i.e., 
based on the likelihood of data from each source and assuming conditional independence. 
The likelihood of data from each source indicating ?̅?, 𝑃 𝑠 |?̅? , depends on the application 
and source, just as 𝑃 𝑠 |𝜃  depends on them. 
𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |𝜃 𝑃 𝜃 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |?̅? 𝑃 ?̅?            (5) 
Finally, the posterior probability of occurrence of the event of interest, 𝜃, is updated 
given the data across sources by inputting the results of the previous calculations into 
Equation (3). This posterior represents an updated understanding of risk for the disaster or 
failure event in real time as data becomes available. 
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4.4 Step-by-Step Summary 
In summary, the steps of the proposed approach are as numbered and described 
below:  
1. Compute prior probability or probabilities of occurrence for the event(s) 
being considered, 𝑃 𝜃 .  
2. Identify the sensor sources available that indicate 𝜃. 
3. Determine which observations from each source indicate 𝜃, with some 
uncertainty.  
4. Integrate likelihoods of data from sensors within each sensor network to 
calculate the overall likelihood of data from each source, 𝑃 𝑠 |𝜃 , 𝑖 1, … 𝑘, 
where 𝑘 is the number of sources. This process varies depending on the data 
output from each source. Repeat this for all sensor sources and states of the 
disaster or failure event. 
5. Calculate the joint likelihood of data from all sources, 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 |𝜃 . 
Assuming the sources are conditionally independent on 𝜃, the joint likelihood 
is the product of all source likelihoods. Repeat this for all states of the event. 
6. Calculate the joint probability of observed data, 𝑃 𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 .  
7. Calculate the final posterior probability of event occurrence updated given 
data from across sources, 𝑃 𝜃|𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 .  
4.5 Sequential Updating 
Additionally, disaster or failure events in a community are often dynamically 
evolving in time. To consider data over multiple sequential time periods to estimate events, 
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sequential Bayesian updating is employed in the steps above. Equation (3) becomes 
Equation (6) to compute a posterior probability using sequential data over two time periods. 
𝑠 represents the first set of data from sensor sources 1, … ,𝑘, and 𝑡, the second set from 
sources 1, … ,𝑚. More time periods can be added as data is available, and it is not necessary 
to collect data from all of the same sources at every time period, as the availability of data 
from each source may change over time. Data output from across sensor networks is 
assumed to be conditionally independent from one time period to the next, with the joint 
likelihood of data from multiple time periods found by multiplying all available 
likelihoods. The purpose of sequential updating is to include data from multiple observed 
periods for updating events that develop and occur over time. Sequential updating in the 
proposed framework ends when updated probabilities approach 1, suggesting that 
occurrence of the event 𝜃 has been detected with near certainty, or when data indicating 𝜃 
is no longer available. After obtaining posterior probabilities from updating or sequential 
updating, the proposed framework can continue to be used to detect 𝜃 in the future, with 
prior probabilities that remain the same or are re-evaluated based on the results of updating 
and the nature of the event of interest, e.g., if events occur as Poisson processes or with 
cumulative effects. For example, if damage is detected in an infrastructure component with 
a certain probability and no action is taken to remediate that damage, the updated 
probability can be assumed as the new prior. In contrast, if action is taken to repair that 
component, the prior probability of damage for future updating may be lower than the 
original prior. The same or additional data sources can be used. 
𝑃 𝜃|𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , 𝑡 , 𝑡 , … , 𝑡
𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 𝜃 𝑡 , 𝑡 , … , 𝑡 𝜃




CHAPTER 5. APPLICATION EXAMPLES OF PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORKS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents four applications of the frameworks described in Chapters 3 
and 4. In sections 5.2 and 5.3, applications and results for the social media processing and 
classification framework are presented. Twitter data is selected as the social media source 
for both applications. 5.2 is an application to explicate the framework’s use and describes 
the construction, evaluation, and comparison of three different classifiers built to identify 
damages in two CIS: transportation and power systems. In 5.3, a classifier constructed and 
evaluated in 5.2 is further evaluated on a set of unlabeled data collected during a hazard 
event to simulate a real-time detection scenario. The results and implications of the 
classifier’s performance for real-time detection are discussed in detail.  
In sections 5.4 and 5.5, applications of the data integration framework are 
presented. 5.4 is an application for estimating flood risk in Louisiana during August 2016. 
In this application, each step in the data integration is presented in detail to explicate the 
framework’s use. The results are validated with true post-event mapping and flood 
modeling. In 5.5, the data integration framework is used to estimate probabilities of 
transportation damage in Atlanta during Tropical Storm Irma. This application includes the 
results from 5.3 and is an example of how multiple data sources can be used to update the 
inputs of a CIS model. Specific validation of the application in 5.5 is not included; rather, 
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the implications and benefits of the probabilistic data integration framework for CIS 
situational awareness and resilience is discussed.   
5.2 Application of Proposed Text-Based Classification Framework for Building 
Supervised Learning Classifiers to Identify Infrastructure Damage 
Classifiers are built to identify damages in two CIS: transportation and power 
systems. Twitter data is selected in this application for CIS monitoring because of its open 
availability, accessibility as a free application, and relatively low costs for data collection 
across communities. All tweets considered in this study are posts of up to 140 characters. 
While photos, videos, and other multimedia attachments can be added to tweets, only the 
texts of tweets for application of the proposed framework. The text-based classification can 
easily be extended across multiple social media platforms as described in Chapter 3. 
The classifiers are trained on data collected over multiple days, referencing multiple 
events and conditions, and only labeled relevant if the referenced damages are current or 
ongoing based on temporal words. Classification is based on the words of a tweet alone, 
without any additional semantic analysis to determine relevance to CIS damages, and the 
method and results presented are not limited to a single type of damage or hazard event. 
Further discussion is provided in 5.3 on the classifiers’ ability to facilitate real-time 
decision-making for the protection and recovery of CIS and increasing resilience of 




5.2.1 Twitter Data Collection and Database 
Two methods are used to build the tweet database. First, to collect tweets in real 
time, tweets are streamed from Twitter using Twitter’s APIs (application program 
interfaces). Each tweet includes the date and time the tweet was created, the text posted, 
information about the poster, and if the poster has selected to enable his or her location to 
appear, the location at which the tweet was posted. Twitter limits streaming to about 1% 
of the total number of tweets published in a given time window (Kumar et al. 2014). The 
second method is to scrape information directly from Twitter’s online search page. This 
method enables searches for openly available tweets posted at any time in the past. For the 
remainder of chapter, these are referred to as “historical” tweets. Though the downloaded 
data for these tweets contain less information than for those streamed in real time, they 
contain the major aspects of a tweet object: the poster’s username, text of the tweet, 
hashtags within the tweet, date and time the tweet was published, number of retweets, and 
location if available. To train the classifiers, the individual words of each tweet are defined 
as the attributes of each datapoint.  
In both the real-time streaming of tweets and reading of historical tweets, datapoints 
are collected containing potential words of interest within the texts. For instance, tweets 
are filtered for keywords that may relate to the CIS of interest or hazard events causing 
damage, including “outage,” “street,” “flooded,” “detour,” etc. Data is collected from 
multiple time periods, including from dates on which a known damaging event has 
occurred. For example, tweets from August 13-21, 2016, covered dates of storms in 
southern Louisiana causing significant and damaging floods. These tweets are filtered to 
contain keywords such as “Louisiana,” “flood,” “flooded,” “power outage,” and “blocked 
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road” to ensure they refer to the event or condition of interest (i.e., the August 2016 floods 
and damages caused by them). As described in Chapter 3, goal is to create a database 
referring to different events and locations while still containing terms referring to critical 
infrastructures or events impacting them. This creates more comprehensive training and 
testing sets such that the models are able to generalize to identifying damages in unlabeled 
data. Tweets streamed during Tropical Storm Irma as it hit the metro Atlanta area on 
September 11, 2017, are used as previously unseen and unlabeled tweets for final 
predictions using the built classifiers in section 5.3 and are not included in the training and 
testing sets. 
In total, 352,514 tweets are streamed or scraped from 27 different days from August 
13, 2016, to November 7, 2017, and are used for developing the training and testing sets 
for relevance to transportation or power damages. The tweets reference a variety of events, 
locations, and potential damages to critical infrastructures.  
5.2.2 Training and Testing Set Development 
Application of the framework for classifying social media data begins with damage 
state definitions and training and testing set development. In this application, the focus is 
on identifying the relevance of tweets to transportation and power system damages. These 
systems are selected because of their prevalence in social media posts compared to other 
systems. For the purposes of increasing situational awareness, only posts that refer to a 
current or ongoing event or system damage state are considered relevant in the damage 
event definitions. References to repaired damages or components back online (i.e., past 
damages) and warnings or advisories (i.e., future or potential damages) are considered 
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irrelevant. Ensuring that posts provide information on current, real-time states supports 
immediate decision-making to increase community resilience, e.g., what areas need 
resources or where to send repair crews.  
In this application, two damage states for each system are defined for a binary 
classification. Each tweet is either relevant to damage or irrelevant. Damage to a 
transportation system is defined as: any closed, blocked, or flooded roadway or highway 
(either fully closed or partially closed); physical damages to roadways or roadway 
structures including potholes, sinkholes, or bridge damages; detours that are required from 
a closed roadway or highway; and any unusual and significant increase in traffic or travel 
times. Power system damage is defined as an outage or a downed or damaged power line. 
Oftentimes, relevant tweets refer to damages occurring in one or both systems at 
multiple scales. Many tweets relevant to transportation damage refer to specific 
intersections, e.g., describing the closest point to a blocked road. In comparison, most of 
the tweets relevant to power damage refer to outages on a larger scale, e.g., for a 
metropolitan area. Tweets referencing both local and system-level damages are considered 
relevant.  
Table 1 shows examples of the texts of relevant tweets within the database for 
transportation and power system damages according to these definitions. Table 2 shows 
examples of irrelevant tweets in the database that contain some keywords that are typically 
present in relevant tweets. 
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Table 1. Example tweets that are relevant to transportation and power system 
damages given definitions 
 Text 
Transportation 
“City of Brookhaven reports fallen tree 
blocking road at Colonial Drive and Pine 
Grove Avenue” 
Power 
“No electricity in Dinwiddie and 
surrounding areas since 18H00, would 
EMM please explain?” 
Table 2. Example of tweets that are irrelevant to transportation and power system 
damages given definitions 
 Text 
Transportation 
“Reminder: Driving past barricades onto 
flooded roads = BAD IDEA. It doesn’t 
take much water to total a vehicle: 
bit.ly/2lnJhcc” (image attached) 
Power 
“#MysteryAI 16-hour power outage 
yesterday. Still trying to catch up and get 
back into some sort of routine.” 
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In Table 1, the tweet relevant to transportation system damages refers to local 
damage within the larger transportation system in a city in the United States. The tweet 
relevant to power system damages refers damage at the system level: a power outage in a 
city in South Africa. In Table 2, while the first tweet refers to flooded roads, it is posted as 
a warning to others about how to react when driving during flood events rather than 
providing information about the current state of a specific road. The second tweet refers to 
a power outage, but one that has occurred previously, as evidenced by the word “yesterday” 
and other context in the post. These tweets are examples of how closely related relevant 
and irrelevant tweets can be. Rather than just identifying a reference to an infrastructure as 
in previous studies, these definitions of relevant and irrelevant information support 
detection of true, real-time damage. Many examples similar to those shown in Table 1 and 
Table 2 are included in the training and testing sets to introduce the models to additional 
attributes that may indicate the relevance or irrelevance of a tweet.  
The training and testing sets to build and evaluate the classifiers are formed from 
tweets manually labeled as relevant or irrelevant to damages for each system. A single 
tweet may appear in a training or testing set for both systems. To represent the binary 
classification of a tweet, relevance to system damage is labeled 1, and irrelevance to system 
damage is labeled 0. While separate classifiers can be constructed through the proposed 
framework to predict individual types of damages within a system, here, a single classifier 
for each CIS type is used to predict all relevant damages in that system.   
As previously described, the database of tweets for constructing each training and 
testing set contains a variety of infrastructure-related words from multiple time periods. To 
label tweets, the database is first searched for tweets containing specific keywords and 
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terms related to damages in each system and the events or conditions that cause them. The 
resulting tweets are either related to the CIS of interest or not related. Tweets that are not 
related contain keywords or terms that could make it appear related. Table 3 shows example 
search keywords and terms.  
Table 3. Example keywords/terms for searching database 
 Keywords/Terms 
Transportation  
Road(s), street(s), highway, lane, closed 
road, blocked road, flood(s), flooded road, 
tree down, accident, major delays, pileup, 
bridge, collapse 
Power 
Power, power outage, no power, 
electricity out, no electricity, electrical 
outage, live wire, down power line, tree 
down, storm 
 
From the results of the search for each system, tweets are then manually labeled as 
relevant or irrelevant to damage. No database can provide the full variety of information in 
tweets published daily that are potentially relevant to CIS damages, with millions of tweets 
continuously available from around the world on evolving topics and trends. However, the 
wide range of search terms and periods used in data collection for this application creates 
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more representative training and testing sets than data from fewer searches and time 
periods.  
Ultimately, 1,065 of the searched tweets are labeled as either relevant (265) or 
irrelevant (800) to transportation system damages, and 301 tweets as either relevant (157) 
or irrelevant (144) to power system damages. The labeled tweets cover 14 and 10 days (i.e., 
out of the 27 represented in the database) for transportation and power systems, 
respectively. The labeled tweets include different examples of damage, types of events 
causing damage (e.g., flooding, storms, vehicle accidents, etc.), and sources of potential 
noise (i.e., irrelevant tweets) to reduce bias towards a single event or type of damage in the 
classifiers. For transportation systems, the majority of tweets relevant to damage describe 
blocked or flooded roadways, and the majority of tweets relevant to power system damages 
refer to power outages. However, selecting a disproportionate number of datapoints 
referencing the same event is avoided to reduce the bias in labeled data. Thus, there is no 
clear distribution of events causing damage in the training or testing sets for either system. 
Additionally, no repeated tweets (retweets) are included in each set, making each of the 
labeled tweets unique. The results are more sensitive to the definitions of damage for each 
system than to the size of the training datasets. This is discussed in subsequent sections, 
including an analysis of the effect of the size of the training sets on results. 
The proposed framework focuses on the texts of the tweets as attributes for training 
and testing the classifiers; therefore, the attributes of each datapoint are the individual 
words in that tweet. The full set of attributes are the words found in all tweets. 75% of 
tweets for each system are used for training. The remaining data for each system is reserved 
for testing and evaluation. In both training and testing sets, the ratio of relevant and 
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irrelevant tweets for each system is preserved. The training and testing sets for relevance 
to transportation system damages have 2,340 and 1,763 attributes (words), respectively, 
and the training and testing sets for relevance to power system damages have 1,233 and 
578 attributes, respectively.  
Prior to building the models, the filtering step removes any attributes or datapoints 
that are found to be unnecessary or insignificant to the classification. Words within a tweet 
are delineated by spaces. However, this can result in erroneous attributes, which are then 
removed. For example, hashtags, URLs, symbols (including conversion of emojis to 
symbols), and users mentioned within a tweet (with the “@” symbol) are considered as 
single words. In addition, the same words with different capitalization are considered 
different attributes, e.g., “ROADS,” “road,” and “Road.” To address these cases, hashtags 
are separated into individual words where possible (e.g., #HurricaneIrma becomes 
Hurricane Irma), all words are converted to lowercase so that repeated words are 
considered as single attributes, and symbols and URLs are removed. Pronouns and articles 
are assumed to be insignificant for determining the relevance of a tweet to system damages 
and remove them from the training and testing data.  
Finally, the filtering step removes datapoints, i.e., tweets, that contain stop words 
or lack necessary keywords. These tweets are automatically denoted irrelevant and not 
useful for building the classifiers (i.e., they are removed as noise).   
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Table 4 summarizes the necessary keywords and stop words used for filtering. The 
necessary keywords overlap with the example keywords used to search the database shown 
in Table 3. The stop words may change depending on the time of data collection (e.g., the 
data collected for this study spanned the 2016 United States presidential election, and thus, 
stop words include “trump,” “obama,” and “clinton”). Requiring at least one of the 
necessary keywords in Table 4 to appear in a tweet removes irrelevant tweets that contain 
a search word from Table 3 but ultimately do not contain any words that identify specific 
components or damages. It is assumed that any leftover misspelled words or grammatical 
errors do not significantly affect the models. The proposed framework includes this final 
filtering process to reduce noise that may appear in the data that are unrelated to any of the 
CIS damages of interest. In this way, the classifiers are trained and tested on data for which 
a significant amount of noise has already been filtered out. The resulting sets for identifying 
transportation damage contain 1,878 and 1,644 attributes for the training and testing sets, 
respectively, and 1,133 and 709 attributes, respectively, for power system damage. Table 
5 summarizes the final sizes of the training and testing sets after this filtering.  
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Table 4. List of filter terms for training and testing set development 
 
Necessary Keywords: 
Tweets must contain at 
least one of these 
Stop Words: 
Tweets cannot 




flood(ed), detour, accident, 







trump, obama, clinton 
Power 
Power, outage, electricity, 

























Transportation 209 551 760 53 189 242 
Power 113 107 220 42 32 74 
 
5.2.3 Classification and Evaluation 
With these datasets, three classifiers are built for each system: support vector 
machines (SVM), naïve Bayes models, and decision trees. These three classifiers are 
selected because of their relatively high explainability, representation of different 
classification algorithms, and prevalence in machine learning applications. The models are 
trained and implemented with Weka, a data mining and machine learning software that is 
implemented in Java (Hall et al. 2009). The hyperparameters are selected as linear kernels 
for support vector machines, Gaussian distributions for attributes per class for naïve Bayes, 
and information gain rankings for determining decision tree nodes.  
The classifiers are built on the training datasets described in the previous section. 
The results of evaluating the models on classifying the training data and of 10-fold cross-
validation on the training set are shown in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively. Cross-
validation results from varying the hyperparameters of each model are used to confirm that 
the selected inputs create the highest performing models without overfitting the training 
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data. For each system and classifier, Table 6 and Table 7 display the percentage of tweets 
correctly classified overall and the precision and recall for each class. The classes being 
predicted are the relevance or irrelevance of a tweet to CIS damage.  






Relevance Irrelevance Relevance Irrelevance 
Transportation 
SVM 99.9 0.995 1.00 1.00 0.998 
Naïve 
Bayes 
88.4 0.78 0.93 0.80 0.92 
Decision 
Tree 
93.4 0.94 0.93 0.81 0.98 
Power 
SVM 99.5 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 
Naïve 
Bayes 
90.9 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.90 
Decision 
Tree 










Relevance Irrelevance Relevance Irrelevance 
Transportation 
SVM 89.2 0.90 0.89 0.68 0.97 
Naïve 
Bayes 
86.2 0.75 0.91 0.76 0.90 
Decision 
Tree 
86.3 0.80 0.88 0.67 0.94 
Power 
SVM 70.0 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.66 
Naïve 
Bayes 
75.0 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.77 
Decision 
Tree 
61.4 0.61 0.62 0.69 0.53 
 
The results show that SVMs have the highest accuracies when evaluated on the 
training data for both systems. In cross-validation, the models decrease in performance, 
with SVMs having the highest accuracy for predicting each class for transportation damage 
and naïve Bayes having the highest accuracy for predicting each class for power system 
damage.  
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Evaluating the results along varying measures for each system provides insights 
into classifier performance. For transportation systems, the cross-validation recall is higher 
for irrelevance than for relevance. This shows that the models are more successful at 
identifying noise in the data than detecting damage. While the models may disregard many 
relevant tweets with a low recall for predicting relevance, the high precision of the models 
for relevance show that when the models classify a tweet as relevant, they have a high 
accuracy. In real-time monitoring of CIS for increased situational awareness, of the two 
measures, having high precision is more valuable than having high recall as it reduces the 
probability of the models incorrectly classifying an irrelevant tweet as relevant. False 
alarms from low precision models for transportation or any other system damage can be 
detrimental for decision-making in repair and recovery and can impede emergency 
response during crises.   
For power systems, the classifiers are less successful in correctly distinguishing 
between relevance and irrelevance to damage. Although predictions on the training sets 
show high accuracies comparable to the models predicting relevance to transportation 
damage, the models predicting relevance to power system damage do not generalize as 
well when evaluated using cross-validation. The cross-validation results also show that, in 
contrast to the transportation classifiers, the power classifiers have higher recall for 
relevance versus irrelevance. This indicates higher performance for identifying damages 
compared to noise in the data. The models’ abilities to accurately identify relevance and 
irrelevance are due to the different types of damage defined for each system, as discussed 
later in this section. 
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 Each classifier is now evaluated on the testing sets, with results shown in Table 8, 
to assess the models’ predictive performance on unseen tweets from the same database as 
the training data. The purpose of using the models to classify the testing data is to further 
assess their generalizability to predict the relevance of unseen data to infrastructure 
damage.  






Relevance Irrelevance Relevance Irrelevance 
Transportation 
SVM 88.4 0.90 0.88 0.53 0.98 
Naïve 
Bayes 
85.5 0.65 0.93 0.76 0.88 
Decision 
Tree 
86.4 1.00 0.85 0.38 1.00 
Power 
SVM 66.2 0.70 0.61 0.71 0.59 
Naïve 
Bayes 
59.5 0.64 0.53 0.67 0.50 
Decision 
Tree 
62.2 0.64 0.58 0.76 0.44 
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As expected, the overall accuracies are the same or lower than the results from 
cross-validation because the testing data introduces the models to larger sets of unseen data 
and results are not averaged across folds. As in cross-validation, the models classifying 
relevance of tweets in the testing set to transportation damage identify noise with high 
recall and precision. In selecting between models, the precision of both the SVM and 
decision tree models for predicting relevance is high. For the naïve Bayes model, while 
precision is lower, its recall for predicting relevance is consistent with the results from 
cross-validation and higher than the other two models evaluated on the testing set. 
However, with a lower precision, more false alarms are present than in the results from the 
other two models. To avoid this, high precision is preferred to high recall for predicting 
relevance. Moreover, the SVM has the highest percentage of correctly classified tweets in 
the test data, and the decision tree model has a very low recall despite having perfect 
precision in predicting relevance. With these results, the SVM is selected as the model with 
the highest performance for detecting both tweet relevance and irrelevance to 
transportation damage.  
In evaluation on the testing data, the power system classifiers also have reduced 
performance compared to the cross-validation results. In this binary classification, 50% 
correct classification of data is equivalent to the results of randomly guessing the class of 
a tweet, and the models perform around this threshold for detecting relevance or irrelevance 
to power system damage. Among the models, the SVM has the highest and most consistent 
performance and has similar precision and recall results for both relevance and irrelevance. 
However, while the models performed well in classifying the training data directly and in 
evaluation with cross-validation with high accuracies as shown in Table 6 and Table 7, 
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their performance in predicting the test data suggests that they do not generalize well to 
larger sets of unseen data. 
To explain the difference in performance requires a closer examination of the types 
of damage identified for each system. The models for predicting the relevance of tweets to 
transportation damage are most successful at identifying noise. On the other hand, the 
models for predicting tweet class for power system damages are more successful at 
identifying relevance, although they do not generalize well for either class. In addition to 
the examples provided in Table 1 and Table 2, Table 9 provides examples of tweets relevant 
and irrelevant to damage in each system according to the definitions. The classifiers’ 
different levels of performance for the transportation and power system data highlight their 








“#BREAKING: The overpass on I-85 just collapsed near Piedmont 
Road” 
“Wisconsin Street Closure in Hobart for Water Main Break 
Cleanup” 
“Power lines down in the street, endless amount of debris. 
Scratching the surface of the damage in #Albany” [photos] 
 
“@n_izzah pothole at Sprint Highway/ Jalan Maarof getting bigger 
and dangerous. Can plse help get DBKL to look into it? many 
TIA.” 
Irrelevant 
“The winner is… the Forth Road Bridge! After discovery of a 
fracture in 2015 engineers repaired & reopened it in 3 weeks 
#ICEpeopleschoice” [link attached] 
“Cheers for the Georgia state troopers who evacuated the #I-85 
bridge before it collapsed. You guys saved lives today (again).  
Thank you” 
“Update on North West flooding repair-around 80% of closed roads 
now reopened & 750metres of flood defences repaired. 
infrastructure-ni.gov.uk/news/update-no…” 
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Table 10. Examples of relevant and irrelevant tweets for damages in power systems 
Class Text 
Relevant 
“Power still out but it’s not 98 degrees like the last time there was a 
sustained power outage.” 
Irrelevant 
“3rd grade made the best out of the power outage this morning by 
reading informational text w/ flashlights. Nothing stops learning @ 
South!” 
“Hello! Due to the power outage and crazy week we were unable to 
put up our Halloween photos, so here they are!... fb.me/7u6jGJiKP” 
 
The transportation system classifiers consistently have high precision for relevance 
because the definitions for damage are distinct, despite having multiple types of damage in 
the definitions considered. On the other hand, these models have lower recall than precision 
for relevance and high recall for irrelevance because irrelevant tweets cover a wide range 
of subjects, including references to noncurrent transportation damages. The initial search 
words and necessary keywords for transportation systems have multiple meanings and can 
reference a variety of conditions or unrelated sentiments that indicate irrelevance regardless 
of the temporal context of a tweet. For instance, the word “accident” can refer to many 
other events besides vehicular accidents that cause transportation system damage. If a tweet 
refers to transportation infrastructure, the classifier must decide if it refers to damage and 
if so, current damage. This increases the difficulty for the classifiers to identify all relevant 
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tweets. However, most irrelevant tweets in the transportation system training and testing 
data do not refer to damage, and the classifiers are successful at detecting noise with high 
precision and recall. In Table 9, tweets relevant to multiple types of damage (i.e., bridge 
collapse and blocked streets from two different causes) are displayed with irrelevant tweets 
that refer to transportation infrastructure but do not refer to damage or refer to past 
damages.  
Compared to the transportation system data, the data for power system damages are 
more nuanced in their distinction between relevance and irrelevance due to the specific 
definitions of damage. Since damages are either power outages or damaged power lines, 
there is less noise from various meanings of the search words and necessary keywords. 
Instead, most irrelevant tweets refer to past events or warnings for future events, and noise 
is less discernable than it is in the transportation system data. While the distinction between 
current and noncurrent damage is critical for increasing real-time situational awareness, 
i.e., only the current state of the system is of interest, the difference between relevant and 
irrelevant tweets is difficult for the classifiers to distinguish. Table 9 shows this nuance 
with one relevant and two irrelevant tweets. While the reader is able to distinguish the 
difference between the current and past power outages in these examples, there are few 
useful temporal attributes that appear consistently enough in the training data from which 
the classifiers can learn without focusing on exact events referenced in individual tweets. 
To improve the performance of the classifiers for detecting power system damage, the 
training sets need to be increasingly representative of relevant and irrelevant tweets, which 
may not be possible as a classification task based on the typical definitions of power system 
damage as used in this study.  
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 The effect of training size on the classifier performance, specifically its recall and 
precision, is now analyzed. Results are shown for the SVM for detecting transportation 
system damage as it generalizes well to evaluate the testing set. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
performance metric of the classifier evaluated through 10-fold cross validation as training 
size increases, where the training size is varied by sampling 10% to 100% of the full 
training set without replacement. In many machine learning applications, the performance 
of a classifier increases as the amount of training data increases. In Figure 2 and Figure 3, 
an initial improvement in performance is seen with increases in training dataset size. 
However, the performance then levels off as the number of datapoints in the training set 
increases. This indicates that the performance would not significantly improve with more 
training data from the database of tweets. Rather, adding tweets from new databases to 
increase representativeness of types of damages within each system or changing the 
definitions of relevance or irrelevance would improve classification performance for 
unseen data.  
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Figure 2. Effect of training size on recall for relevance 
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Figure 3. Effect of training size on precision for relevance 
 
In the next section, the same filtering steps from the framework – summarized in 
Figure 1 – is used to apply the classifier to predict the presence of transportation damages 
in a separate, unlabeled dataset of tweets. The model’s capabilities to predict the classes of 
new data are assessed. Given the poor performance of all three classifiers for predicting 
relevance to power system damage in the testing set, focus is on detecting transportation 
system damage in the next section. 
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5.3 Application of Social Media Classifiers for Identifying Critical Infrastructure 
Damages During Tropical Storm Irma in Atlanta, Georgia  
The original training and testing datapoints manually labeled in section 5.2 were 
selected from the same overall database of tweets from 26 different days of historical and 
streaming data collection. The goal of the framework for processing and classifying social 
media data is to increase monitoring capabilities and situational awareness for current and 
previously unidentified system states. In this section, a model is used to classify a set of 
unlabeled tweets collected in real-time during a hazard event for relevance to transportation 
system damages. The new data is separate from the original training and testing data and 
collected during a hazard event. The SVM classifier for transportation system damage is 
used because of its high precision and accuracy for both classes. Performance is evaluated 
based on the ability to predict the relevance or irrelevance of tweets retrieved during a 
hazard event.  
The hazard event of interest is Tropical Storm Irma as it hit the Atlanta area. In the 
analysis, 188,267 tweets are streamed from September 11, 2017, when the storm reached 
Atlanta, filtering for words related to infrastructure damages, the Atlanta area, and Tropical 
Storm Irma. Tweets are streamed from around the world, but for this data collection in a 
hazard event, tweets are filtered for references to Atlanta as CIS damages were anticipated 
during the event in the city and surrounding area. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) declared a Major Disaster Declaration in Georgia on September 15, 2017, 
with all counties covered for Individual and/or Public Assistance (FEMA 2017). 
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Data processing of the unlabeled tweets follows the flowchart as shown in the 
Training and Testing Set Development portion of Figure 1. As in first developing the 
training and testing data for transportation systems in section 5.2, the unlabeled tweets are 
searched for words and terms relevant to potential transportation damages. Due to the 
importance of the hazard in this event and to simulate real-time detection, the search terms 
for the unlabeled data also include words referring to Tropical Storm Irma and the Atlanta 
area as well as the terms related to transportation damages. Tweets that do not contain 
necessary keywords and contain stop words are also removed, but tweets are not manually 
evaluated for relevance. Instead, the transportation system SVM is used to automate 
predictions of relevance in the unlabeled data. After filtering, the dataset for analysis 
consists of 16,106 tweets, again demonstrating the reduction of a large dataset to a more 
manageable dataset for assessment.  
These unlabeled tweets are classified with the built SVM model. The SVM predicts 
the class for 16,106 datapoints in 5 seconds on an 8 GB RAM computer with 1.70 GHz 
processor, so it is efficient for real-time monitoring. The classification results in 2,130 
tweets (13.2%) relevant to transportation damage and 13,976 irrelevant tweets. After 
discounting retweets, 1,192 relevant datapoints remain. To evaluate the performance of the 
classifier, the 1,192 unique tweets predicted relevant by the SVM are then manually 
assessed to determine which are truly relevant to transportation damage based on the 
definitions and which are irrelevant. 813 are found to be relevant and 379 are irrelevant, 
for a precision of 0.68. While this is lower than the 0.90 precision in evaluating the 
classifier on the testing data, as expected for this unlabeled dataset, the model is still able 
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to classify unique tweets with better than 50% precision for data that is compiled 
completely separately from the original training and testing data.  
Evaluating the correctly and incorrectly classified relevant tweets reveals the types 
of tweets the model classifies well and those it mistakenly classifies as relevant. The 
correctly classified tweets explicitly reference closed or blocked roads or roadway 
structures across a variety of causes, including floods and accidents. In addition, the model 
correctly classifies types of damage not included in the original definitions of damage for 
transportation systems. For instance, closed rail tracks are not included in the original 
definitions but appear in the tweets classified as relevant by the model. As the objective is 
to identify current damage in transportation systems, these are considered correctly 
classified tweets from the model. The SVM identifies these damages, not originally defined 
in the model, from the attributes of the tweets. The tweets incorrectly classified as relevant 
include references to school and facility closings, warnings regarding weather and crisis 
preparation, and references to repaired damages (e.g., reopened roads after closings).  
These insights from the classification results inform adjustments to the definitions 
of damage, the development of training and testing sets, and the sets of necessary keywords 
and stop words for filtering prior to creating the model. Because trends, topics, and events 
discussed on social media platforms are constantly evolving, models for increasing 
situational awareness for CIS must be trained on data that are representative of current 
events and language. Therefore, training and testing sets should be kept up-to-date to reflect 
time-appropriate context. It is important to add data from new databases to the training data 
to continually maintain or increase their representativeness for real and current damage 
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events and prevalent social media language to use the classifiers for increased situational 
awareness and community resilience.   
5.4 Application of Proposed Data Integration Framework for Flood Event 
Estimation in Louisiana, United States 
In this section, a specific example to illustrate application of the proposed data 
integration framework is presented. The application is to update flood risks in the state of 
Louisiana during August 10-13, 2016, by integrating data from both physical and social 
sensor sources using the proposed framework. Flood risk around the world is increasing 
due to climate change and other environmental factors (Hirabayashi et al. 2013), and 
Louisiana is known to be subject to high flood risk given its low elevation and coastal 
proximity (Groves et al. 2016). Flood events are distributed over large geographic areas 
that cannot be completely and continuously monitored in real time. In addition, uncertainty 
exists in terms of event timing and location based on a combination of factors in the natural 
and built environments (Morss et al. 2005).  
Therefore, there is the opportunity to integrate data from multiple sensor sources to 
increase situational awareness for these events. This application example is also chosen 
due to the availability of post-event data for validation of the approach for the flood events 
impacting Louisiana in August 2016. Flooding during this time resulted in a FEMA disaster 
declaration in 26 parishes on August 14, 2016, an estimated $30 million in relief efforts 
from the American Red Cross, and over $110 million of estimated losses for Louisiana’s 
agriculture industry (Van Der Wiel et al. 2017).  
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The data sources selected for integration for event estimation are stream gages (a 
physical sensor type) from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and tweets 
(microposts) from Twitter (a social sensor type). Prior probabilities of flood events in each 
parish are derived from FEMA flood risk maps. The results are validated by comparing the 
dates and locations of updated flood risks to the true flooding that occurred in Louisiana in 
August 2016.  
In the subsections that follow, each step in obtaining updated estimated flood risks 
based on collected data is explained within the structure of the proposed framework. Steps 
referred to specifically correspond to the steps of this data integration framework 
summarized in Section 4.4.  
5.4.1 Prior Probabilities and Data Source Identification 
For the application, let 𝜃 be defined as flood occurrence in a single parish (county) 
in Louisiana and ?̅? indicate nonoccurrence of a flood in the same parish with 𝑃 ?̅? 1
𝑃 𝜃 . FEMA Flood Insurance Risk Maps are used to derive a prior probability of risk, 
𝑃 𝜃 , and its complement for all 64 parishes. These maps, which are part of the National 
Flood Insurance Program, designate zones of the United States that are likely to be 
inundated in a flood event (Burby 2002). The base-level flood considered is the 100-year 
flood, or flood with a 1% probability of occurrence in a given year. The regions that will 
be inundated during the base flood event are named Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) 
and are highlighted on the flood risk maps.  
Figure 4 shows an example flood risk map for Ascension Parish in Louisiana. This 
screenshot is from a publicly available interactive map developed by the Louisiana State 
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University Agricultural Center, which allows users to view flood risks in Louisiana by 
parish (LSU AgCenter and LADOTD 2017). 64% of Ascension Parish is covered by a 
SFHA (shaded in the figure) and will be inundated in a 100-year flood event. The remaining 
area of each parish outside of the zone is expected not to be inundated in such an event. 
 
 
Figure 4. Example flood risk map with 100-year floodplain shaded for Ascension 
Parish, Louisiana (LSUAgCenter and LADOTD 2017) 
 
An example event of interest 𝜃  is flood occurrence in Ascension Parish. 
The prior probability of this event is assumed to be 1% (the probability of flood inundation 
in a given year in a SFHA) multiplied by the fraction of the parish area covered by the 
SFHA. For Ascension Parish, this results in a probability of 0.64% for a prior knowledge 
of flood risk, and this is defined as 𝑃 𝜃 . This process is repeated for all 64 
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parishes in Louisiana resulting in a range of prior probabilities of 0.05%-0.88% across all 
parishes. As with all probability estimations, there are potential errors in defining these 
priors. However, these represent typical assessments of flood risks in the United States, so 
they are considered sufficient to set an initial estimation of risk for each parish. 
For data integration, data from two publicly available sources (𝑘 2) are selected 
that, with some uncertainty, indicate a flood within each parish. The first data source (𝑠 ) 
is physical sensor data from USGS, which monitors the conditions of the nation’s streams 
and rivers with near-real-time data from stream gages. A sudden increase in gage height is 
selected as the measurement of interest to provide updating information on the probability 
of flood occurrence for each parish. The second data source considered (𝑠 ) is social media 
big data from Twitter. The data collected from Twitter includes the texts of tweets and 
metadata such as date, time, and tweet location, if available. Tweet relevance to flood 
events is selected as the metric of interest, which is determined using a machine learning 
classifier, built using the social media data processing framework as described in Chapter 
3.  
These sources are also selected to demonstrate how the data integration framework 
can be used to integrate data from unrelated sources. By integrating information within 
each individual network before integrating data from across sources, this framework is able 
to consider unique data likelihoods for 𝜃 from each source.  
5.4.2 Data Collection and Indications of Flood Events 
Next, data is collected from the two sources and determine which observations from 
each source indicate a flood event for each parish.  
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5.4.2.1 Gage Height from USGS Stream Gages 
From the USGS stream gages, data from all gages outputting gage height in 
Louisiana from June to August 2016 is collected. 235 stream gages in Louisiana provide 
downloadable gage height data during the period of interest. Gage height is reported at 
every 15- or 30-minute interval, depending on the gage. Figure 5 provides an example of 
available gage height data from a stream gage in Louisiana during a week in August. 
 
 




Full flood predictions are based on a combination of topology, rainfall, streamflow, 
and gage height data, as well as other hydrological and meteorological measurements. The 
objective of this study is to investigate the updating of prior estimations of event risk with 
data from multiple sources, rather than precise hydrologic modeling of flood systems. 
Therefore, a sudden increase in gage height is taken as the indicator of flood occurrence.  
To find sudden increases, daily average gage heights are first computed over the 
period of data collection. From these averages, the percentage increase between each day 
is calculated. 𝑦  represents the percentage increase from the previous day to the current day 
for the 𝑗  stream gage. A percentage increase in daily average gage height 𝑦  over 100%, 
i.e., the average gage height at least doubled from one day to the next, indicates a potential 
flood event at that stream gage. With this indicator of flood risk in the area surrounding a 
stream gage, the data is binarized to indicate a flood event in an area on a particular day if 
𝑦 100%. For this example, data that does not indicate a flood event, where 𝑦 100%, 
is not considered, but such data can be incorporated if the likelihoods based on such an 
indication can be calculated. Here, the focus of this application is on the differences in 
updating from unrelated data sources, and only the 𝑦 100% indication is chosen for the 
stream gage sensor source. The uncertainty of this indicator is accounted for when 
computing the overall likelihood of the sensor network, and the proposed framework 
allows for additional measurements and uncertainties from the same source indicating 𝜃, 
such as multiple thresholds for a sudden increase in gage height. Using other thresholds for 
indicating a flood event (e.g., 𝑦 150%) would add or remove datapoints from the 
analysis, with the overall process to calculate posterior probabilities remaining the same.   
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From the data, 66 stream gages indicated a flood at least once during the three-
month data collection period from June to August 2016, with several gages indicating 
floods multiple times within the period. These are the observations that indicate occurrence 
of the event of interest 𝜃 and are used for updating in the following steps. Figure 6 shows 
the locations of these stream gages in Louisiana and the dates on which they indicated a 
flood for the period August 10-13, 2016.  
 
 
Figure 6. Stream gages in Louisiana indicating a flood, August 2016 
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5.4.2.2 Tweet Relevance to Flood Events 
The Twitter data for this application is downloaded using Twitter’s Streaming API 
and by scraping historical tweets from Twitter’s search page. To determine which 
observations from this data source indicate a flood event in each parish, a machine learning 
classifier is built to predict a tweet’s relevance to a flood event, defined 𝑧. The prediction 
is binary: a tweet is either relevant (𝑧 1) or irrelevant (𝑧 0) to a flood event. The 
classifier is then used to determine which tweets from the period of interest are relevant to 
flood events. After the tweets are classified, they are sorted by location.  
The classifier is a support vector machine (SVM) model built using Weka. To build 
the model, a small training set is first compiled by manually labeling tweets as relevant or 
irrelevant to flood events. This training set is assembled with a diverse set of tweets that 
refer to many different flood events and also unrelated phenomena or events to ensure the 
model generalizes and classifies relevance for tweets regarding any flood event. The full 
database is comprised of tweets downloaded to contain initial search terms related to CIS 
damages and hazard events and is described in Section 5.2.1. In this application, tweet 
relevance to a flood event is defined as tweets referring to current flood events, excluding 
updates about flood recovery efforts and expressions of sympathy from others. For this 
training and testing set, tweets collected during the analysis period, August 10-13, 2016, 
are not included. Just as tweets collected during Tropical Storm Irma in Atlanta are used 
as unlabeled data for a detection scenario in Section 5.3, tweets collected during the data 
integration period are left unlabeled for this classification task, i.e., flood event 
identification. 
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The final training set for this application consists of 496 tweets. In the training set, 
125 tweets are relevant and 371 are irrelevant. A small testing set is also compiled to 
evaluate the model’s performance at classifying new tweets, which is next used to 
determine this sensor source’s likelihood. The testing set contains 214 tweets, manually 
classified with 55 relevant and 159 irrelevant tweets. Table 11 shows the confusion matrix 
for the model evaluated on the test set. The model’s classification of a tweet is denoted by 
𝑧, and the true value of a tweet’s relevance is denoted by 𝜆, where 1 indicates true relevance 
and 0 indicates true irrelevance. 
Table 11. Confusion matrix for support vector machine classifier tested for tweet 
relevance to flood events 
Classified as 𝒛 1 Classified as 𝒛  0 True Class 
34 21 𝜆 1 
7 152 𝜆  0 
 
The confusion matrix shows the performance of the model for evaluating the test 
set. The top row (𝜆 1) shows 34 tweets were correctly classified as relevant, while 21 
tweets were incorrectly classified as irrelevant. For 𝜆 0, the second row shows that 7 
tweets were incorrectly classified as relevant although they were truly irrelevant. True 
positives are the tweets correctly classified as relevant by the model (the top left corner of 
the confusion matrix). Recall is calculated as 0.618.  
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This represents a measure of accuracy expressing the likelihood of a correct tweet 
classification given true relevance to a flood, also represented by the conditional 
probability, 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜆 1 . The recall of the model in automatically classifying the 
testing set is used as the measure of the model’s reliability. This value is used to calculate 
the likelihood of tweet relevance collected from Twitter in the next step of the updating 
process.  
Using the built classification model, unlabeled tweets from August 10-13, 2016, 
filtered for the word “flood” are classified as relevant or irrelevant with the accuracy 
discussed above. As the event of interest, 𝜃, is flooding in a parish, tweets are next filtered 
by location, if that metadata is available, to categorize them by parish in Louisiana. If 
location is not available, the attributes (i.e., words) of each tweet are compared to a 
comprehensive list of municipalities and their respective parishes in Louisiana (Smith 
2005). If the tweet contains one of the cities or towns on the list, it is considered a tweet 
relevant to a flood event for that parish. Of course, this means some tweets that are found 
may not truly be located in Louisiana (e.g., Iowa, Louisiana, is a town in Calcasieu Parish, 
but tweets found mentioning Iowa typically refer to the state of Iowa). Uncertainty in the 
data is accounted for by calculating the sensor source likelihood in the following section.  
This process ultimately results in a list of tweets relevant to flood events for each 
parish. Table 12 shows an example of one of the tweets found relevant to a flood event in 
East Baton Rouge and Tangipahoa Parishes on August 12, 2016. There is no location 
attached to the metadata of this tweet, so its associated locations are determined by 
searching the text for municipalities from the aforementioned list. The text of the tweet 
indicates Baton Rouge, LA (East Baton Rouge Parish), and Hammond, LA (Tangipahoa 
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Parish). The tweet is therefore categorized to update the state estimations for these two 
parishes.  
Table 12. Example of tweet classified as relevant and containing location indicators 
for Louisiana 
Date Tweet Text 
August 12, 2016 
“Move to higher ground! Flash 
Flood Warning continues for Baton 
Rouge LA and Hammond LA until 
1:00 PM CDT” 
 
5.4.3 Likelihoods of Data from Each Source 
5.4.3.1 Likelihood of Gage Height Data 
The daily likelihoods of 𝑦 100% given a flood event in a parish 𝜃, 
𝑃 𝑦 100% 𝜃 , are now calculated, where 𝑦  is the percent increase in daily average 
gage height for the 𝑗th stream gage and 𝑗 1, … ,𝑛 for 𝑛 stream gages indicating a flood 
event on the day in question. There is little validated empirical data that can be used to 
estimate the likelihoods of observing the data 𝑦 100% given a flood event in a parish 
𝜃. Therefore, these likelihoods are calculated with a decaying function for 
𝑃 𝑦 100% 𝜃  that decreases in likelihood with each gage’s distance from the parish 
being considered. Figure 7 shows the function used in this application, where distance is 
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expressed in degrees of latitude and longitude. 𝑃 𝑦 100% 𝜃  is assumed to be 1 when 
stream gage 𝑗 is in the parish considered by 𝜃, i.e., a stream gage will certainly show a 
daily average gage height that doubles from one day to the next given a flood in a parish if 
it is located in that parish. As the distance between the parish and stream gage increases, 
𝑃 𝑦 100% 𝜃  decreases. The distances are measured from each stream gage to the 
nearest point on the border of the parish considered by 𝜃.  
 
 
Figure 7. Decaying probability function with distance for stream gage sensor 
likelihood 
 
As an example, on August 10, 2016, only one stream gage in Louisiana reported 
𝑦 100% where 𝑗 1  as shown in Figure 6. That stream gage’s distance away from 
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every parish was calculated and input into the function in Figure 7. The results are the 
likelihoods of observing 𝑦 100% given flood events in each parish. For all stream 
gages, it is assumed that any 𝑃 𝑦 100%|𝜃  less than 0.01 is insignificant for updating 
and can be expressed as 0. Ultimately, there are 64 ∙ 𝑛 likelihoods for each day, one from 
each stream gage, out of 𝑛, for each of the 64 parishes. 
Next, the likelihood of observed data for all stream gages, 𝑃 𝑦 100% |𝜃 , is 
computed by combining the daily likelihoods of all stream gages indicating a flood in a 
parish. There is no assumption of independence between these likelihoods and the total 
probability theorem is used to integrate them. To do this, a variable, 𝑔 , is introduced to 
represent the 𝑗  stream gage out of all stream gages indicating a flood per day. 𝑃 𝑔  is 
simply , so that each stream gage indicating a flood event is weighted equally. Let 𝑔  be 
independent of 𝜃 and 𝑦 , so 𝑃 𝑦 100% 𝑔 ,𝜃 𝑃 𝑦 100%|𝜃 . Independence is 
created for this variable to facilitate the integration of likelihoods of gage height data. To 
eliminate this assumption of independence, more information on the combined likelihood 
of data from stream gages indicating a flood for each parish is needed. The likelihood of 
observed data for all stream gages is calculated as shown in Equation (7). 
 𝑃 𝑦 100%|𝜃 ∑ 𝑃 𝑦 100% 𝑔 ,𝜃 𝑃 𝑔         (7) 
If no data from other sources is available, as is the case for some parishes on August 
10, 2016, the probability 𝑃 𝑦 100%  is computed, and the need to compute joint 
probabilities between multiple data sources in Step 6 is eliminated. To calculate 
𝑃 𝑦 100% , first, 𝑃 𝑦 100%  is calculated for each stream gage empirically by 
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dividing the number of days the gage read 𝑦 100% by the total number of days on 
which data was collected. These values are then combined with total probability using 𝑔  
to result in 𝑃 𝑦 100% .  
The likelihoods of the stream gages indicating a flood given no flood occurrence in 
a parish are computed as shown in Equation (8). The expression is derived using total 
probability.  
𝑃 𝑦 100% ?̅?
% 𝑦 100% 𝜃
             (8) 
In assessing this sensor source, including more or fewer datapoints by changing the 
threshold 𝑦  from 100% to another value would change the overall likelihood depending 
on the likelihoods from the individual stream gages added or removed. For instance, if 
more stream gages are included in the analysis, but some of those stream gages are farther 
away from the parish of interest (i.e., with lower likelihoods), the overall likelihood will 
decrease even though more information is available. In other cases, decreasing the number 
of stream gages available may increase the final posterior probabilities if those that remain 
are in or very close to that parish, making the overall likelihoods of stream gage data at or 
close to 1. Due to the nature of the data collected, the individual likelihoods of each stream 
gage are important in calculating this specific sensor source likelihood. This is in 
comparison to the calculation of the Twitter data source likelihood as discussed in the 
following section. 
5.4.3.2 Likelihood of Tweet Relevance to a Flood Event 
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Tweets indicating a flood event in a parish during August 10-13, 2016, are collected 
from Twitter and classified by the built SVM flood model. The likelihood of tweet 
relevance to a flood event, 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜃 , is calculated using the number of tweets indicating 
a flood in each parish. 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜆 1  is the recall calculated by the performance of the 
classifier. The number of tweets available is an indicator of classification accuracy 
(Musaev et al. 2014). Therefore, in Equation (9), the recall accuracy metric is factored by 
the number of tweets indicating a flood in the considered parish 𝑁  to compute the 
probability of tweet relevance given 𝜃. This uncertainty is added to the likelihood 
calculation because most of the tweets are geolocated based on the presence of Louisiana 
city or town names in their texts, which does not guarantee correct categorization of 
indicated tweets by parish. Moreover, there are many fewer tweets available for each parish 
compared to the total number of tweets for each day. The classifier is therefore assumed to 
be less likely to predict the relevance of these specific tweets of interest correctly. In 
reducing the accuracy metric by  
 
, the likelihood of tweet relevance in a parish is 
higher when there are more relevant tweets in that parish. That is, if there are more relevant 
tweets mapped to a parish, the higher the source likelihood, 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜃 , will be. In contrast 
with the overall likelihood calculations for stream gage data previously described, the 
likelihood of this social sensor source given a flood event in a parish does not depend on 
varying likelihoods of individual tweets due to the nature of the data collection and 
observations. 
𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜃 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜆 1
 
       (9) 
 79
To calculate the probability the model will classify any tweet as relevant, 𝑃 𝑧
1 , the total number of tweets classified as relevant on a day is divided by the total number 
of tweets collected on each day, regardless of location. 𝑃 𝑧 1  is taken as the same value 
for all parishes. This value is necessary on August 10, 2016, when several parishes are 
referred to by tweets classified as relevant to a flood, but no stream gage data is available 
because those parishes are too far away from the only available stream gage indicating a 
flood on that day. Therefore, Twitter is the only available data source for those parishes, 
and the joint probability calculation in Step 6 is replaced by 𝑃 𝑧 1 , as is the case when 
only stream gage data is available and only 𝑃 𝑦 100%  is needed. Finally, 𝑃 𝑧 1 ?̅?  
is derived from total probability just as 𝑃 𝑦 100% ?̅?  was calculated in Equation (8) to 
calculate the likelihood of data for the complement of 𝜃. 
The calculations and integration of data likelihoods within each network in this 
application is used to demonstrate the required information to use in Step 4 of the proposed 
framework. The specific calculations for this step will vary depending on the nature of the 
data collected for each source. For the example, the gage height data represents a source 
for which the likelihoods of individual observations can be integrated, while Twitter data 
represents a source for which the number of indications of 𝜃 and the accuracy of classifying 
individual observations can be used to obtain the overall likelihood of the source. It is 
acknowledged that the assumptions and simplifications made in the analysis of both data 
sources for indicating flood events may not include other factors used in more 
comprehensive flood modeling and detection. The data collection and integration of 
information from these sources in the example explicates use of the framework for data 
with different likelihoods.  
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5.4.4 Probabilities of Data, Integration of Data Likelihoods, and Final Updating 
The data from each source, gage height and tweet relevance, are conditionally 
independent given the event of interest 𝜃. The joint likelihood of data from both sources 
on each day is calculated using Equation (10).  
𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1|𝜃 𝑃 𝑦 100%|𝜃 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜃                               (10) 
The joint probability of observing the data from both sources is calculated using 
Equation (11), with information included on both states of a flood event in a parish: 
occurred, 𝜃, and not occurred, ?̅?. 
𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1 𝑃 𝑦 100%|𝜃 𝑃 𝑧 1|𝜃 𝑃 𝜃
𝑃 𝑦 100% ?̅? 𝑃 𝑧 1 ?̅? 𝑃 ?̅?           (11) 
For this application, data is also sequentially updated from August 11-12, 2016, and 
August 12-13, 2016. The probability of data from the two-day intervals is calculated using 
Equation (12). Subscript 1 refers to likelihoods calculated on one day, and subscript 2 refers 
to likelihoods calculated on the following day.  
𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1,𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1  
𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1|𝜃 𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1|𝜃 𝑃 𝜃
𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1 ?̅? 𝑃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1 ?̅? 𝑃 ?̅?          (12) 
For the application, the final posterior probabilities for each parish in Louisiana are 
computed using Equations (13) and (14), with Equation (14) used for sequential updating. 
The sequential updating here is limited to two days because with the amount of data 
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available during this time period, updating using more than two days of data results in 
posterior probabilities of nearly 1 in several parishes (i.e., nearly 100% probabilities of 
flood occurrence in a parish) with the remaining parishes receiving little to no updating.  
𝑃 𝜃|𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1
𝑦 100%|𝜃 𝑃  𝑧 1 𝜃
%,
                                      (13) 
𝑃 𝜃|𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1,𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1  
𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1 𝜃 𝑦 100%, 𝑧 1 𝜃
%, , %,
                     (14) 
In cases when data from one source is completely unavailable (e.g., if there are no 
relevant tweets in a parish), the prior risks are updated with information from only the other 
source. When there is no data available from any source, the prior risk remains unchanged. 
In other applications with more than two sources, the joint probabilities of different 
combinations of sensor sources must be computed.  
5.4.5 Results 
5.4.5.1 Results Over Time 
Using the proposed framework for integrating data across multiple sources, the 
resulting updated probability distributions for flood risk by parish are mapped in Figure 8 
for each day of the four-day period of investigation. The lowest probabilities in light yellow 
show the parishes that had little or no data with which to update their prior probabilities of 
flood events. From Figure 8, few updated probabilities are computed on August 10. The 
highest updated probabilities of flood occurrence in a parish on each day from August 10-
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13, 2016, are 0.05 (Orleans Parish), 0.45 (Ascension Parish), 0.73 (St. Tammany Parish), 
and 0.81 (Livingston Parish), respectively. The largest changes in prior to posterior risks 
occurred on August 12.  
 
 
Figure 8. Resulting updated probability distributions for August 10, 11, 12, and 13 
 
Figure 9 shows sequential updating results, from August 11 to 12 and from August 
12 to 13, and the effect of combining data from multiple days. The largest updated 
probability of flood occurrence in a parish after sequential updating from August 11 to 12 
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was 0.998 (East Baton Rouge), and for sequential updating from August 12 to 13, 0.999 
(East Baton Rouge and Livingston).  
 
 
Figure 9. Updating and sequential updating results with sensor observations from 
August 11 to August 11-12 and August 12 to August 12-13 
 
5.4.5.2 Results by Sensor Type 
As an objective of this study is to integrate multiple data sources for event 
estimation, the effect of additional data on the estimation is investigated, specifically 
looking at the results using data from single sensor sources compared to combining the 
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chosen datasets. Figure 10 shows the results of updating probabilities of flood risk on 
August 12, 2016, by parish based on only stream gage data, only Twitter data, and then 
using information both sensor sources.  
 
 
Figure 10. Resulting updating probability distributions for August 12, 2016, using 
gage height and tweet relevance data sources alone compared to estimation from 
integrating both data sources 
 
Using information from both sources significantly increases the updated 
probabilities. For instance, in St. Tammany Parish, three stream gages indicated a potential 
flood event based on increased gage height and two tweets were classified as relevant to a 
flood event. The prior probability is computed to be 0.0065. The resulting updated 
probabilities are 0.17 and 0.08 for updating with gage height data and tweet relevance data 
alone, respectively. When data from both sources are included in the inference, the updated 
probability of flood risk is 0.73. This is seen for all parishes that have data with which to 
update their prior probabilities of flood risk; updating with an individual data source does 
not result in a posterior probability higher than 0.20 on August 12, while both data sources 
combined update probabilities up to 0.73. This is due to the joint probabilities of observing 
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data from multiple sources being smaller than the probabilities of observing data from one 
source alone. Therefore, even as more data is available from one source, the probabilistic 
estimations experience the most updating when multiple data sources indicate the same 
event 𝜃.  
5.4.5.3 Validation and Data Availability  
The results of the approach and analyses are compared to the true flooding that 
occurred in August 2016 in Louisiana for validation. The floods caused a Major Disaster 
Declaration from FEMA, and 26 parishes were designated for Individual or Public 
Assistance, shaded in Figure 11 (FEMA 2016). The results in Figure 8 and Figure 9 show 
increased flood risks after updating in most of the parishes listed in the Major Disaster 
Declaration. Of the 26 parishes with a declared Disaster Declaration, 17 are updated based 
on the data from August 12, and an additional six parishes not updated on August 12 are 
updated based on data from August 13. Figure 12 shows parishes with updated probabilities 
in dark blue and parishes without data to update priors in green for August 12 and 13, and 




Figure 11. Louisiana Disaster Declaration for flooding event in August 2016, 
FEMA-4277-DR (Reprinted from FEMA 2016) 
 
 
Figure 12. Parishes with updated probabilities of flood risk (dark blue) from 
integrated data sources on the dates shown 
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The updated probabilities also include nine parishes not in FEMA’s Disaster 
Declaration. This can be explained by a number of factors. FEMA considers numerous 
variables when deciding on areas for Disaster Declarations. Some of these factors include 
localized impacts, insurance coverage in force, estimated cost of assistance, and other 
federal assistance programs (FEMA 2017). Ultimately, flooding may have occurred in 
parishes updated by data, even if they are not part of the Disaster Declarations.  
For those parishes included in the Disaster Declaration that did not have updated 
probabilities of flood risk from the application, this is due to a lack of availability of data 
indicating a flood event for those particular parishes. The presence of data is essential in 
the framework to estimate the event of interest. For any application, different sensor 
sources or different measures for which sensors indicate the event of interest would create 
different results. Figure 13 shows the availability of data indicating 𝜃 over time for each 
parish. The number of available observations is shown, for counts of stream gages with 
sudden increases in gage height, number of tweets classified as relevant, and total daily 
datapoint counts from combining both sources.  
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Figure 13. Stream gage and Twitter data availability by parish from August 10-13, 
2016 
 
To further validate the results, USGS post-event maps are examined to qualitatively 
evaluate the results of applying the framework to the application example. After the flood 
events in August 2016, USGS created a report to summarize the flooding and developed 
several flood inundation maps based on high-water marks. The report also included a map 
of cumulative rainfall across the state during August 11-14, 2016. This and the inundation 
map for Louisiana with shaded areas indicating inundation is shown in Figure 14 (Watson 
et al. 2017). 
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Figure 14. Precipitation in Louisiana from August 11-14, 2016 (left) and inundation 
map for Louisiana (right) (Reprinted from Watson et al. 2017) 
 
 
Figure 15. Map of sequential updating from August 12-13, 2016, with regions of 




Specifically, extensive inundation around the Amite and Tangipahoa rivers affected 
parishes in the northeastern portion of Louisiana’s “boot.” These include three of the 
parishes with the highest updated probabilities of flood occurrence using the proposed 
approach: East Baton Rouge Parish, Livingston Parish, and St. Tammany Parish. These 
correspond to the areas of highest precipitation during the time period investigated and 
with areas of confirmed inundation. The integrated data during August 10-13, 2016, 
updates the prior probabilities of flood occurrence from 0.0055, 0.008, and 0.0064 to 0.73, 
0.81, and 0.73 for East Baton Rouge, Livingston, and St. Tammany parishes, respectively. 
Figure 15 shows the results of sequential updating for the application from August 12-13, 
2016, with regions of highest precipitation (left) and verified inundation (right) from Figure 
14 highlighted. The regions of highest precipitation (shown in dark orange and red in 
Figure 14, left) correspond to the boxed parishes in Figure 15 (left). The inundation around 
the Amite, Comite, Tickfaw, and Tangipahoa Rivers mapped in Figure 14 (right) 
correspond to the boxed region in Figure 15 (right).  
5.5 Application of Proposed Data Integration Framework for Estimating 
Transportation Damage During Tropical Storm Irma in Atlanta, Georgia  
The proposed data integration framework is also applied to predict transportation 
damage on an intersection (i.e., at two roadways) in Atlanta, Georgia, during Tropical 
Storm Irma on September 11, 2017. Here, the event of interest, 𝜃, is this specific roadway 
in a transportation network being blocked or impassable during the hazard event. This 
transportation system component is selected because of its proximity to a major water 
supply for the city, and this same water supply is part of the larger system evaluated in 
Chapter 6. The purpose of this application is to demonstrate potential both of the social 
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media data processing framework and the data integration framework to provide new, real-
time information for a network model to predict overall system behaviors and 
vulnerabilities.  
The transportation component for analysis is an intersection of two roadways in 
Atlanta, Georgia. These roadways are shown in bold in Figure 16, among surrounding 
streets and roads which are not in bold. The intersection’s proximity to a water supply 
component is also shown in Figure 16. The water supply is labeled as Supply 4 and shown 
as a white circle for consistency with the network analyzed in Chapter 6. The black line 
represents a link (i.e., pipe) from Supply 4 to another component in the water network. An 
uninformative prior probability of component failure during the hazard event (e.g., the 
roadway is blocked or flooded) is chosen as 𝑃 𝜃 0.01.  
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Figure 16. Roadways needed to access a water supply (Supply 4) for repair in 
Atlanta, Georgia 
 
Twitter data and USGS stream gages are selected as data sources for integration, 
and similar likelihood calculations as from Section 5.4 and classifier as from Section 5.3 
are used for the analysis. From USGS, gage height from a single stream gage on the day of 
analysis is collected and observed because of its location compared to the CIS components 
of analysis. The stream gage indicates potential damage to the transportation component 
by showing a sudden increase in gage height on the day of analysis. As in Section 5.4, a 
sudden increase is calculated as a greater than 100% increase from one day to the next. 
While this indication is used to calculate the likelihood of data for a different event, flood 
occurrence, the same indication is used here to demonstrate how sensor sources can be 
used to observe different events, including hazard occurrence and CIS damages. More 
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sophisticated urban flood models can replace this to determine accurate indications of 
flooded roadways given meteorological or hydrological data. The data downloaded for this 
stream gage is shown in Figure 17. The likelihood of observing gage height data indicating 
damage to the transportation component is a function of the stream gage’s distance away 
from the transportation component. The same distance function used in Section 5.4.3 is 
employed for this application to compute the stream gage likelihood. The location of the 
stream gage compared to the transportation component is shown in Figure 18. 
From Twitter, tweets collected and classified as relevant to transportation damage 
during this event in Section 5.3 are used for updating. Of these, tweets indicate potential 
damage for the transportation component if they are located in or specifically reference 
Atlanta. Ultimately, 14 tweets that are classified as relevant by the transportation SVM 
model in Section 5.3 contain references or geotags to Atlanta or local Atlanta communities. 
An example of one such tweet is shown in Figure 19. The likelihood of observing the 
Twitter data collected is the accuracy of the classifier (i.e., the 0.68 precision calculated in 
Section 5.3) factored by the number of relevant tweets available, as done for the likelihood 
of tweets indicating a flood in Section 5.4.3. 
The final updated probability of failure for the roadway is 0.25 from the collected 
data from both sources, which can be directly used as inputs to probabilistic network 
models, such as the BN model used in Chapter 6. Possible extensions of this work are to 
collect data from additional sources to include in the updating process and to estimate 
damage on other transportation components during the same event for comparison.  
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Figure 17. Example gage height data for a stream gage in Atlanta, Georgia (Data 
from USGS 2017) 
 
 




Figure 19. Example tweet related to transportation damage in Atlanta, Georgia 






CHAPTER 6. PROBABILISTIC SYSTEM MODEL ANALYSES 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, probabilistic system model analyses are presented to evaluate the 
impact of network parameters and topology on overall vulnerability and resilience. In a 
single network, Atlanta’s water network, parameters are varied and system performance 
(i.e., vulnerability) is evaluated under those variations. System performance is also 
compared across multiple, small-size water networks to further investigate the impact of 
network topologies and connectivities on overall system vulnerability. All analyses are 
conducted with a Bayesian network (BN) model, described in Chapter 2 and again in this 
chapter.  
6.2 Atlanta Water Network, Varied Parameters, and Network Model 
This study first investigates three parameters of Atlanta’s water distribution 
network including service provision and access for repair interdependencies across power 
and transportation systems. Geographic dependencies are accounted for through common 
hazard exposure in nearby nodes. The schematic of the CIS and its supply and distribution 
nodes is shown in Figure 20. Electrical power is needed at the supply nodes and roadways 
are located across the area, which are required to access the water supply nodes for repair 
operations. A representation of the BN model is shown in Figure 21, with water supply, 
water distribution, electrical power, and access for repair (e.g., roadway) nodes indicated. 
MLS components connecting multiple distribution components (i.e., Distr. Comp 1 and 
Distr. Comp 2) to supply components 1 and 2 are also shown. 
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The parameters of a CIS are defined as including aspects of the physical network 
structure (e.g., the layout of links, or pipes, between water distribution components), 
service provision interdependencies within and across systems, and parameters of specific 
components in the system (e.g., probabilities of component failure given hazard 
occurrence). The effects of varying the following parameters on overall system behavior 
are evaluated: conditional probabilities of failure for water supplies, power supplies, and 
access for repair components; the number of power supply nodes in the network; and the 
configuration of links in the water network. Changes to each of these parameters affect 
overall system performance. This study focuses on the impacts of network changes on 
predicted performance at the distribution components of the water distribution system in 
evaluating the results of the inferences.  
Two types of inferences with varied parameter values are conducted for analysis. 
First, inferences are conducted with no evidence. These inferences result in the marginal 
probabilities of failure for all water, power, and transportation components represented in 
the CIS BN. The outcomes are then compared across the varied parameter values to detect 
trends in component performance. For these results, decreased marginal probabilities of 
failure for distribution components indicate decreased likelihoods of outages at those points 
providing CIS services. Increased marginal probabilities of failure correspond with 
increased likelihoods of service outages. Second, inferences are conducted under a hazard 
occurrence or specific water or power supply component failure. The outcomes from these 
inferences correspond with predictions of CIS performance under failure or hazard 
scenarios. The results show the effects of outages in the power and water systems on the 
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final states of distribution components and the impacts of varying network parameters on 
system resilience, particularly the ability of the system to withstand such a disruption.  
The component-level results are evaluated according to four characteristics of the 
distribution components to assess the types of components for which changes have the 
largest impacts. Distribution components are linked to supply nodes, with MLSs indicating 
the minimum sets of components needed to deliver the CIS resource from a supply to 
distribution node. The characteristics considered for each distribution component are the 
number of water supplies linked to the distribution component, shortest physical distance 
from a supply to the distribution component in terms of pipe length, number of MLSs for 
the distribution component (i.e., number of minimum paths from any supply to the 
distribution component), and minimum number of links from the distribution component 








Figure 21. Representative Bayesian network model of interdependent CIS 
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6.3 Component Conditional Probabilities of Failure 
The infrastructure components in the CIS BN comprise water supply, water 
distribution, power supply, and access for repair transportation components such as 
roadways required for crews to access failed water system components for repair. The 
baseline network for comparison assumes a 0.01 conditional probability of failure given 
hazard occurrence for all water distribution, water supply, power supply, and access for 
repair components. The consistent 0.01 value enables relative comparisons of performance 
across components. The baseline network also assumes a 0.01 probability of hazard 
occurrence across the system. The 0.01 values are within the ranges of typical probabilities 
of component failure or hazard used in engineering risk applications but can be changed 
with any additional information at the component or hazard levels. The system outcomes 
from using the 0.01 probability values are the baseline to which all other results are 
compared for this network.  
The conditional probabilities of failure are varied given hazard occurrence for the 
water supply, power supply, and access for repair nodes in the CIS BN. These variations 
correspond with changes that can occur as the system evolves over time. For example, 
decreasing the conditional probability of failure of a component can occur from retrofit 
upgrades or other preventive measures taken to increase component-level resilience. On 
the other hand, an increased probability of failure given hazard occurrence indicates a 
damaged or aging component, including a component that has not been upgraded or fully 
repaired after a less severe hazard event.   
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In the analysis, the supply and access conditional probabilities of failure given 
hazard are varied from the baseline 0.01 down to 0.0001, 0.003, and 0.005, and up to 0.05, 
0.1, 0.15, and 0.2. The maximum is set at 0.2, as it is assumed that any component with a 
greater than 0.2 probability of failure given a hazard will no longer be operable, i.e., it will 
be out of service and repaired. The conditional probabilities of failure are modified by 
changing the CPTs of the supply and access nodes. Inferences are conducted at each 
parameter value to calculate marginal probabilities of failure for all components. The 
relative change, 𝑅𝐶, in marginal failure probability from the baseline for a component is 
computed as in Equation (15). 𝑝  and 𝑝  are the original marginal probability of 
failure calculated with the baseline 0.01 failure probabilities, and the new marginal 
probability of failure calculated with the varied component conditional probabilities, 
respectively. 
𝑅𝐶  (15) 
Figure 22 to Figure 25 show the relative changes in marginal probabilities from the 
original baseline results for all distribution components varying the conditional 
probabilities of failure for power supply components. Each figure gives the relative change 
against a particular component characteristic. These characteristics are the number of 
reachable supplies to a distribution component (Figure 22); the shortest physical distance 
between a distribution component and a supply as measured by pipe length (Figure 23); 
the number of MLSs indicating the number of minimum paths connecting a distribution 
component to a supply (Figure 24); and the minimum number of links to a supply, 
representing the fewest number of components in any MLS for the distribution component 
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(Figure 25). A line at 0 relative change from the original prior marginal probability of 
failure is indicated. Inference results for each varied value of component conditional 
probability of failure from 0.0001 to 0.2 is represented by a different marker. Positive 
relative changes indicate increases in marginal probabilities of failure. 
 
 
Figure 22. Relative change in marginal probabilities of failure versus number of 




Figure 23. Relative change in marginal probabilities of failure versus shortest 
distance to supply for components with one reachable supply 
 
 
Figure 24. Relative change in marginal probabilities of failure versus number of 




Figure 25. Relative change in marginal probabilities of failure versus minimum 
number of links from components to supply 
 
From Figure 22, distribution components in the water network have either one, two, 
or three reachable supplies. The results show that components with more than one supply 
have little to no change in their marginal failure probabilities regardless of variations in 
power supply conditional probabilities of failure, while components with one supply have 
relative changes of up to three times the baseline (i.e., a 300% change). Having multiple 
reachable supplies is a type of redundancy in the system, limiting the impacts of changes, 
whether positive or negative, in probabilities of failure of any given supply. 
Focusing on one-supply distribution components in Figure 23, the relative changes 
are found to be a function of each component’s distance to a supply, with the relative 
changes in marginals being highest for components closest to a supply. In Figure 24, the 
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relative change in marginal probabilities is highest for components with one or two MLSs 
and decreases as the number of MLSs for a component increases. Components that have 
multiple MLSs have different paths available to the supply, representing redundancies in 
the system. With increased MLSs, there is an increased influence on the performance of 
the distribution component from the states of the links comprising the MLSs compared to 
the state of the supply nodes. Therefore, components with more MLSs have smaller relative 
changes with variations in the supply conditional probabilities of failure. Figure 25 shows 
a similar finding for the minimum number of links in a MLS for a component. In Figure 
25, the relative changes in marginal probabilities of failure are largest for those components 
with few links to a supply and decrease as the number of links increases. 
In addition to assessing the trends in changes in probabilities of failure for 
components of different characteristics, Figure 22 to Figure 25 show how increasing 
compared to decreasing supply failure probabilities leads to differences in impacts at the 
distribution components. Increased conditional failure probabilities at the power supplies, 
representing aging, damage, or lack of repair, correspond with much higher relative 
changes in failure probabilities at the distribution nodes compared to decreasing the 
conditional probabilities, representing retrofit upgrades or preventative measures, by the 
same amount. These results suggest that to increase CIS resilience, there is a greater benefit 
to repairing aged or slightly damaged components that may have increased conditional 
probabilities of failure compared to retrofitting components that may have already 
relatively low failure probabilities. 
Looking more closely at the results shown in Figure 23, the decrease or increase in 
relative change with varying power supply component conditional failure probabilities 
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appears to follow an exponential trend as distance to a supply increases. A similar trend is 
seen in Figure 24 and Figure 25, where components with fewer numbers of paths to a 
supply and fewer links to a supply have higher relative changes. These results are consistent 
because as distance from a supply increases, components are more likely to have increasing 
numbers of paths to a supply and increasing numbers of links in their MLSs.  
To quantify the increasing or decreasing exponential trend for the relative change 
in marginal failure probabilities versus distance to supply, exponential functions of the 
form shown in Equation (16) are fit to the data. The exponential fit function has two 
coefficients, 𝑎 and 𝑏. The best-fit values for these coefficients are found for each varied 
value of power supply conditional probability of failure. Figure 26 shows the resulting 
exponential trendlines for relative change in component failure probability as distance from 
a component to a supply increases. Individual trendlines are shown for each varied value 
of conditional failure probability. For both increased and decreased conditional failure 
probabilities from the 0.01 baseline, the 𝑏-coefficient value indicating rate of decay is the 
same: -1.665e-5. The 𝑎-coefficient value varies depending on the value of the supply 
conditional failure probability. The 𝑎-coefficient is negative for decreased conditional 
probabilities of failure and positive for increased probabilities. The coefficient value 
increases linearly as a function of the conditional failure probabilities as shown in Figure 
27, indicating larger predicted relative changes in distribution component performance 
with increased variations in supply component conditional failure probability. For 
decreased conditional failure probabilities, the differences between 𝑎-coefficient values 
also decrease, so that the exponential fit functions become increasingly similar to each 
other. This result supports the previous finding that decreasing the conditional probabilities 
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results in much smaller relative changes in distribution component outcomes than 
increasing them. The system is thus more vulnerable to higher conditional failure 
probabilities including due to minor damage and not as improved by component upgrades 
when prior component conditional failure probabilities are low.   
𝑓 𝑥 𝑎𝑒   (16) 
 
 
Figure 26. Exponential trendlines for each conditional failure probability for power 
supplies, for relative changes in component outcomes as a function of shortest 




Figure 27. 𝜶-coefficient values of exponential fit functions versus varied network  
parameter 
 
Varying the conditional probabilities of failure in the water supply CPTs produces 
similar results to changing the power supply probabilities of failure. The results for the 
relative changes in performance at the distribution components versus component 
characteristics for changes in water supply conditional probabilities of failure are similar 
to those shown in Figure 22 to Figure 25 and are therefore not shown here. The water 
supplies depend directly on the states of the power supplies, supporting the similarity in 
results. 
The states of the access for repair nodes are one step removed from the day-to-day 
performance of a CIS. The reliability of a node needed to supply access to repair any failed 
nodes is only relevant for the cases of failures in the network. Therefore, varying the 
conditional failure probabilities of the access for repair nodes has the largest effect on the 
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resulting marginal probabilities of failure of the access for repair components themselves, 
and little to no influence on the marginal probabilities of failure of the distribution 
components. Relative changes in marginal probabilities for the access for repair 
components increase up to nine times when increasing access component conditional 
probabilities of failure from the baseline 0.01 to the maximum 0.20, and decrease up to 0.5 
times when decreasing the access component conditional probabilities of failure from the 
baseline 0.01 to the minimum 0.0001. This difference in effect from increasing compared 
to decreasing component conditional probabilities of failure is consistent with previous 
results; increasing conditional probabilities of failure has a higher impact on results than 
decreasing probabilities of failure including in comparing results from changes of similar 
magnitudes. Among the conditional probabilities of failure at the component level, varying 
the failure probabilities for access for repair components has the smallest impact on system 
behavior. This result is due to the fact that an increase or decrease in failure for an access 
component in post-disaster recovery does not impact the network’s overall performance 
unless there is an outage occurrence where a water or power component needs repair.  
6.4 Redundant Power Supply Components 
In this section, backup power supplies are added to the water distribution system to 
evaluate the effects of redundancies on system resilience. These redundancies are 
implemented by adding power supply node parents to the water supplies in the CIS BN. 
This network parameter change addresses vulnerabilities arising from service provision 
interdependencies in the CIS. The parameter variation reflects actions connecting water 
supplies to multiple substations or adding backup generators at the water supplies. The 
redundant power supply works such that a failure of one power supply does not lead to a 
 110
water supply failure. Instead, if one power supply fails, the other can be utilized to provide 
service. The additional power supplies are feasible and practical redundancies to be added 
to a system and several municipalities and water distribution utilities are implementing 
such actions to improve CIS resilience.  
The lower marginal probabilities of failure for each of the water supplies from 
adding a redundant power supply at the water supply result in lower probabilities of failure 
for all distribution components. To quantify these changes, Figure 28 shows the relative 
change in component marginal probabilities of failures from the original priors with the 
added redundancy in power supplies as a function of the different distribution component 
characteristics as in Figure 22 to Figure 25. The negative relative changes show the 
decreases in marginal probabilities of failure when redundant power supplies are added. 
These results show similar trends to those found for directly decreasing the conditional 
probabilities of failure for the water and power supply components. The components with 
the largest changes in probabilities of failure are those with one water supply, shorter 
physical distance to a supply, fewer MLSs, and fewer minimum numbers of links to a 
supply. 
The trends also match an exponential relationship, and an exponential function is 
fit for the relative change in marginal probabilities of failure of distribution components as 
a function of component characteristics. For a function of the form shown in Equation (16), 
the 𝑎- and 𝑏-coefficient values for the shortest distance to a supply, number of MLSs, and 
minimum number of links to a supply are shown in Figure 28. The resulting negative 𝑎-
coefficient values are larger in magnitude than any of the 𝑎-coefficients in the fit functions 
for decreasing the conditional probabilities of the power supplies directly, meaning that the 
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relative changes shown in Figure 28 are larger than any relative changes calculated after 
decreasing conditional probabilities of failure for the power supplies (i.e., the blue 
triangular datapoints in Figure 22 to Figure 25). Therefore, adding redundant power 
supplies has more impact on system performance than decreasing conditional probabilities 
of failure for individual power supplies. 
 
 
Figure 28. Relative changes in marginal probabilities of failures after adding 
redundancies at each water supply versus (a) number of supplies, (b) shortest 
physical distance to a supply, (c) number of MLSs, and (d) minimum number of 




6.5 Additional Link Analysis 
Finally, the system’s link configuration is altered by adding new links to the water 
distribution system (i.e., new pipes). This network parameter variation corresponds with 
the action of building out new parts of a CIS. To evaluate the effect of adding new links, 
potential connection points for new links are searched in the existing system and the effect 
of adding those links on resilience is assessed. In the analysis, inferences are conducted 
over a failure scenario in which a failure at Supply 4 leads to the failure of two distribution 
nodes, indicated A and B as shown in Figure 29. In Figure 29, the marginal probabilities 
of failure for each component are shown with a color bar. The darker red components show 
failed components, and the lighter yellow components show that the remaining nodes in 
the network have significantly lower marginal probabilities of failure, indicating that they 
are unaffected by a failure at Supply 4.  
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Figure 29. Failure scenario where failure of Supply 4 leads to failure of two 
distribution nodes 
 
To identify potential new links to add, nearby nodes are searched to identify 
locations for new links to be built from the failed distribution nodes. New links connect 
each failed distribution node to a non-failed distribution component where a link does not 
already exist, starting with the closest component. An inference is then conducted for the 
new link configuration under the Supply 4 failure scenario. The baseline values for 
component conditional probabilities of failure are used to compare results across the 




Figure 30. (a)-(d) from top left, right, bottom left, bottom right – New links added to 
the network and inference results for Supply 4 failure 
 
The inference results show that a new link protects Nodes A and B from failing if 
it connects them back to another supply through new MLS paths. In Figure 30a (top left), 
connecting one failed distribution node (Node A) to another distribution node with multiple 
supplies does not lead to the creation of a new MLS path. Figure 30b (top right) shows the 
placement of a new link in the system, connecting failed Node A to a different non-failed 
distribution node, which protects both distribution nodes from failing. In this scenario, the 
new link connects both Nodes A and B to Supply 2 as well as Supply 4, and neither Nodes 
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A nor B fail when Supply 4 fails. Figure 30c-d show new links connected from Node B to 
other distribution nodes. However, when connecting Node B to its closest non-connected, 
non-failed distribution components, paths to additional supplies are not created to protect 
either failed distribution node. In this case, adding new links from Node A to nearby non-
failed distribution components has a larger effect on improving overall system resilience 
than adding new links connecting Node B to nearby components. In general, adding links 
in the system improves performance if they are able to link failed components to additional 
supplies.  
To quantify the effects of the varying system link configurations on resilience, the 
component failures are mapped to disruptions of service in the surrounding communities. 
The outcomes in the varying scenarios are compared and evaluated in the context of 
affected populations, housing units, and critical facilities. The population serviced by each 
component is estimated using United States Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Each 
census block is matched to the nearest water system component, and the number of people 
affected by a component’s failure is estimated as the sum of populations of the census 
blocks matched to it. Similarly, the number of housing units affected is estimated as the 
sum of housing units located in the census blocks matched to a failed component. The 
critical facilities affected are estimated using Open Street Map data (Open Street Map 
2018), identifying hospitals, schools, churches, fire departments, and potential evacuation 
locations within each census block. It is assumed that each component in the water system, 
including supply components, immediately services the surrounding population. 
Additional service information can be included if available. An example of the resulting 
matching between CIS components and populations is shown in Figure 31, where the 
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colored blocks are associated with three nodes, Supply 4 and the two distribution 
components subject to failure if Supply 4 fails. 
 
 
Figure 31. U.S. Census blocks associated with Supply 4 and two distribution 
components that fail in Supply 4 failure scenario 
 
For the failure scenario in Figure 29, 96,217 people; 57,445 housing units; and 
seven critical facilities are estimated to experience disruption of service from a failure at 
Supply 4 and the subsequent failure at Nodes A and B. The same disruptions occur if the 
power supply at Supply 4 fails and there are no other redundant power supplies. After 
adding new links from Nodes A or B (e.g., Figure 30a-d) to non-failed distribution 
components, the new extents of disruptions of service are computed. The results for the 
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original and the potential new system link configurations are shown in Table 13. The figure 
numbers corresponding to each new schematic are shown in the table. For the varying 
system link configurations, the second option (i.e., Figure 30b) results in the lowest 
disruption of service under the failure scenario. Figure 30d results in the same disruption 
of service as the original configuration. The last line of  Table 13 shows disruption of 
service if Node B were to survive, but Node A fails.  
Evaluating CIS outcomes in terms of estimated populations affected by component 
failures informs future decision making when implementing retrofit upgrades and new 
system build-outs based on quantified impacts on increasing resilience. 
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Table 13. Estimated disruptions of service for Supply 4 failure scenario  
Link 
Configuration 










96,217 57,445 7 
Figure 30a: 
Supply 4, 
Node A, and 
Node B fail 
96,217 57,445 7 
Figure 30b: 
Supply 4 fails 
21,340 12,203 2 
Figure 30c: 
Supply 4 and 
Node A fail 
62,829 37,748 5 
Supply 4 and 
Node B fail 
54,728 31,900 4 
 
6.6 Vulnerability Assessment Across Multiple Networks 
Finally, inferences are conducted with the BN model and results are compared 
across 36 small-size water networks to further investigate the impacts of system topology 
and connectivity on overall performance. This is essential for planning future systems and 
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identifying the types of networks and the surrounding communities they serve that are most 
vulnerable.  
 Eight distinct networks are selected for the analysis. Two of the networks are real 
water networks, the Atlanta water network (individually analyzed in Sections 6.2 – 6.5) 
and the Shelby County water network in Tennessee (Johansen and Tien 2018). The 
remaining networks are synthetic networks (Giudicianni et al. 2018; University of Exeter 
2019). As an objective of this study is to compare topology and connectivity with regard 
to supply-to-distribution component paths, additional networks are added by varying the 
number of supplies in each network. This creates a total of 36 networks, which are 
summarized in Table 14. The Atlanta water network is denoted as Network 2 in this section.  
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Table 14. Descriptions of multiple small-size water networks for vulnerability 
comparisons 
Network Type # Nodes, 𝒏 # Edges, 𝒎 # Versions 
1 Real 49 71 9 
2 Real 112 122 8 
3 Synthetic 25 44 4 
4 Synthetic 48 51 6 
5 Synthetic 20 21 2 
6 Synthetic 32 34 2 
7 Synthetic 12 14 2 
8 Synthetic 37 58 3 
 
 
 To evaluate overall system performance and vulnerability across all networks, 
inferences are conducted over the BN model without evidence for each network and its 
derivatives. This same type of inference is conducted in Sections 6.2 – 6.4 for varying 
network parameters for the Atlanta water network. The average marginal failure 
probabilities for all components in each network are compared against the networks’ 
topological characteristics, including density, average node degree, and average path 
length, and diameter. These are typical metrics used in graph theory to describe graphical 
structures, which are often used to represent CIS.  
 Since, this analysis focuses specifically on pathways between supply and 
distribution components, average path length is computed as the average number of links 
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in a MLS for each network, and diameter is also computed using supply-to-distribution 
pathways, i.e., MLSs. The calculations for density 𝑞, average path length 𝐴𝐿, and diameter 
𝐷 are summarized in Equations (17) – (19). For these calculations, 𝑛 represents the number 
of nodes in a network, 𝑚 is the number of edges, 𝑠 is the number of supplies, and 𝑑  is the 
length of a MLS between supply 𝑖 and distribution component 𝑗. Average node degree is 
the average number of neighbors (i.e., connections) each component has in a network.  
𝑞   (17) 
𝐴𝐿
∑ ∑
  (18) 
𝐷 max 𝑑   (19) 
 Figure 32 shows these metrics versus the size of the networks in terms of number 
of nodes. Since density is the same for each distinct network regardless of number of 
supplies, only the eight distinct networks are plotted in Figure 32, left. As the size of a 
water network increases, its density generally decreases while its diameter increases, which 
is consistent with previous works, i.e., Giudicianni et al. 2018. Its average path length will 





Figure 32. Graph metrics versus network size 
 
The inference results are shown in Figure 33 to Figure 37. In Figure 33, the average 
component probability of failure for each network is shown to decrease as density 
increases, and in Figure 34, the same trend is seen for average failure probability as average 
node degree increases. These trends are expected because higher density and average node 
degree indicate more connected networks with more pathways. That is, more connected 
networks should have more MLS redundancies between supply and distribution 
components. However, Figure 33 and Figure 34 also show that for a distinct network, the 
average failure probability can vary greatly depending on the number of supplies. For 
instance, Network 4 is represented by the purple squares in Figure 33 and Figure 34. The 
number of supplies in the network varies from one to seven. With inferences conducted 
over all eight derivatives of the network, the average failure probability ranges from 0.0005 
and 0.0015. Since the number of supplies has a significant impact on each system’s overall 
vulnerability, the number of reachable supplies per component is evaluated next. 
 The number of reachable supplies is counted for each component in a network 
through its MLSs. In this study, MLSs are found through a depth-first search process as in 
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Applegate and Tien 2019, but different paths can be added to the BN model depending on 
the physical flow of commodities throughout a CIS. Components across all 36 networks 
have between one and five reachable supplies, with the average number of reachable 
supplies for the components in each network ranging from one to three. The number of 
components with only one reachable supply, i.e., distribution components without 
redundancies to different supply components, are also counted for each network.   
 
 





Figure 34. Average failure probability of network components versus average node 
degree 
 
Overall system vulnerabilities are shown for average supplies per component in a 
network and fraction of one-supply components in a network in Figure 35 and Figure 36, 
respectively. In Figure 35, average failure probability decreases as the average number of 
supplies per component increases. Increasing the number of redundancies per components 
in a system therefore reduces overall system vulnerability, as expected. However, with 
more than one redundancy, i.e., more than two supplies per component, overall system 
 125
vulnerability levels off and does not continue to decrease. This suggests that it is more 
valuable for overall system resilience to ensure that all components in that system have at 
least one redundancy, rather than continuing to add redundancies to specific components. 
 
Figure 35. Average failure probability of network components versus average 
number of reachable supplies per component 
 
 In Figure 36, overall system vulnerability decreases as the fraction of one-supply 
components in a system increases. This is consistent with the results in Figure 35; networks 
with more uniformly distributed redundancies are less vulnerable. The increase in overall 
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system vulnerability is not linear, and as the fraction of one-supply components in a 
network surpasses 50%, the average failure probability in a network increases more 
quickly.  
 Lastly, Figure 37 shows overall system vulnerability versus the average supply-to-
distribution component path lengths in each network. Here, the same shapes are used to 
represent each distinct network in the figure, i.e., Networks 1-8, and the color bar represents 
the number of supplies in each network. This way, the number of supplies in each network 
can be compared as average path length (i.e., average MLS length) increases. While overall 
system vulnerability generally increases with average path length, the number of supplies, 
and ultimately, the number of redundancies in a system is more impactful for reducing 




Figure 36. Average failure probability of network components versus fraction of 





Figure 37. Average failure probability of network components versus average 
supply-to-distribution component path lengths in each network 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized in Sections 7.2 – 7.4. Section 
7.2 presents the contributions of the framework for processing and classifying social media 
big data, including implications from applications of the framework. Section 7.3 presents 
the contributions of the probabilistic data integration framework. Because the steps of the 
framework are demonstrated in detail in the flood estimation application, contributions are 
further elaborated on by discussing the flood estimation results. Section 7.4 summarizes 
contributions of the probabilistic system model analyses conducted. The final section of 
this chapter is a description of future work and directions for continuing to increase CIS 
situational awareness and resilience with heterogeneous data and probabilistic analyses.  
7.2 Social Media Data Processing and Classification Framework and Applications 
This work provides a roadmap and insights to using social media data for CIS 
assessment and increasing situational awareness. The contributions of this framework are 
elaborated through the application results. Machine learning-based classifiers are built and 
evaluated for predicting the relevance or irrelevance of Twitter data to transportation and 
power system damages in real time. SVM, naïve Bayes model, and decision tree models 
are built based on training and testing sets developed for each system that represent a 
variety of damages, causes of those damages, and irrelevant information. A datapoint is 
only considered relevant if it references current or ongoing events or damage.  
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In the application, the classifiers for predicting the relevance of tweets to 
transportation system damages achieve high overall accuracies, high recall for determining 
irrelevance, and high precision for determining both classes when evaluated with cross-
validation and on the testing set. High precision is preferred to high recall for detecting 
relevant tweets because it reduces the amount of falsely detected damages. Based on this 
metric, the SVM achieves the highest performance for classifying transportation damage. 
The classifiers predict relevance of tweets to power system damage with high accuracies 
for the training data but have significantly lower accuracies when evaluated using cross-
validation and on the testing set. In evaluating the use of the classifiers to detect damage in 
real time among newly collected datapoints, a separate, unlabeled set of tweets collected 
during Tropical Storm Irma are classified for transportation system damage using the 
highest performing SVM model. The SVM is able to predict the classes for 16,106 
unlabeled tweets in 5 seconds with a precision for detecting damage of 0.68.  
These models, evaluations, and predictions on unlabeled data describe the cases 
and scenarios for which machine learning classifiers are able to predict the relevance of 
tweets to CIS damages with specificity and accuracy. The contributions of this proposed 
framework and applications for building and assessing these automated classifiers are 
threefold:  
1. The development and filtering of the training and testing sets for two systems with 
different definitions of damage is discussed in detail. In one system (transportation), 
multiple types of damage are considered relevant and the sources of noise compared 
to relevant information in the data are discussed. In the other system (power), only 
two types of damage are considered relevant (i.e., power outages and damaged 
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power lines) and the nuances between relevant and irrelevant information that 
hinder successful classification are presented, underscoring the need for diversity 
and representativeness in training datasets. The ability to build classifiers that detect 
current and ongoing damages is demonstrated. In both systems, this distinction 
between current and ongoing damages and references to past or future damages are 
most difficult for the models to detect. While this significantly lowers the 
generalizability of the models for identifying power system damage, the classifiers 
for transportation system damage are successful at identifying most of the irrelevant 
tweets in evaluation with cross-validation and on the testing data. The highest 
performing model (SVM) is able to classify the test data with an accuracy of 88.4%. 
Creating classifiers that can automatically distinguish current damage from other 
references to the CIS of interest is essential for increasing situational awareness 
using social media data.  
2. One of the classifiers is evaluated on a separate, large set (16,106) of unlabeled 
tweets to show how well it generalizes to predict relevance of data collected in real-
time during a hazard event. While the performance of the classifier decreases from 
the testing set results as expected, the classifier is able to correctly identify 
relevance with a precision of 0.68 for this new dataset. High precision for relevance, 
limiting false alarms in detected datapoints for damage, is particularly important 
for the social media data to contribute to increasing situational awareness in a 
community and to support emergency response decisions. 
3. Insights and recommendations are presented to improve the performance of 
classifiers for determining social media data relevance to critical infrastructure 
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damages. It is found that performance is more sensitive to the definitions of damage 
for each system, including the consideration of only current or ongoing damage as 
relevant and the specificity of the events of interest. The size of the training set, 
classifier type, and model hyperparameters have less effect. The classifiers also 
have the potential to identify CIS damage not explicitly included in the original 
damage event definitions, as shown in the predictions on the separate, unlabeled 
dataset.  
7.3 Heterogeneous Data Integration Framework and Applications  
The data integration framework provides a unique probabilistic approach to 
integrating data from across sources to estimate the probability of disaster or failure event 
occurrence given observed data. It updates prior probabilities of event occurrence with both 
individual and combined data sources. The framework is able to include data from a wide 
range of sensor types with varied likelihoods and shows how prior risks of an event change 
as new, potentially anomalous data is introduced. It is applicable to general disaster or 
failure events, including natural disasters and structural or infrastructure system failures as 
long as data is available. The Bayesian updating approach for data integration does require 
the establishment of prior probabilities of event occurrence. If these are unknown, they are 
initially assumed with the potential use of uninformative priors to limit bias in the results.  
In an application example, the framework is applied to estimate flood events in 
Louisiana in August 2016. Prior flood event risk in a parish is calculated based on FEMA 
risk map data. For updating in the application, physical stream gage data and social Twitter 
data are used. Data from other sensor sources can be easily added using the same approach 
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presented, with new likelihood calculations for each additional sensor type. While these 
likelihoods will be defined differently depending on the data output by each source, the 
general framework is flexible such that changing these will not change the implementation 
process as long as the sensor source likelihoods can be found.  
The results from updating prior flood risks in Louisiana from August 10-13, 2016, 
show that additional data over time and from across both sensor sources increases the 
amount of updating possible in real-time event estimation. The results are validated by 
comparing the parishes with highest updated probabilities with FEMA disaster declarations 
and post-event inundation and precipitation maps from USGS. This showed similar regions 
of flooding indicated based on updating from the integrated datasets as from the true event.  
In another example, the proposed framework is used to update probabilities of 
damage for a transportation system component during a hazard event. The transportation 
component is an intersection in Atlanta that is necessary for access to a supply component 
in the city’s water network. The same data sources as for the first application example, 
USGS stream gage and Twitter data, are integrated to estimate component damage during 
Tropical Storm Irma. This example demonstrates the framework’s use for monitoring CIS 
components with information from multiple sensor sources measuring different conditions. 
Here, stream gage data indicates potential weather conditions that cause damage to the 
intersection, while Twitter data indicates any possible damage on the roadway to make it 
impassable. Results from this application can be directly input into probabilistic system 
models, such as the BN model used for analysis in this dissertation. 
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Probabilistic updating using the proposed framework increases situational 
awareness and can be used to support community decision-making during and after disaster 
or failure events. The impacts of the results obtained from integrating data using the 
proposed framework are in three main areas, described with the flood estimation 
application: 
1. Updating prior risk assessments based on integrated inferences from multiple data 
sources improves situational awareness, particularly if done in real-time, with 
updated probabilities indicating locations or components most likely to be 
experiencing the event at the time assessed. In the example application, 
communities have a more holistic view of their flood risk from monitoring both 
conditions from the natural environment and firsthand accounts from community 
members of a current event.  
2. Based on the granularity of the estimation, comparing updated probabilities 
facilitates prioritization of resources by location and time during a disaster or failure 
event. In the application, directly comparing flood risks between parishes supports 
real-time decision-making and resource allocation during emergency response by 
identifying the most vulnerable parishes. 
3. The framework enables assessment of the monitoring capabilities of different data 
sources. By integrating data first within networks then across sources, the updating 
approach reveals the availability of data and the updated probabilities from 
individual compared to combined sources post-event. These results evaluate a 
community’s monitoring capabilities, demonstrate what types of data are available 
throughout the community, and detail where multiple data sources can effectively 
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supplement each other. The application shows how stream gage data and Twitter 
data contribute to updating prior risks, both individually and particularly when 
combined. 
7.4 Probabilistic System Model Analyses 
Finally, this dissertation assesses the impacts of varying parameters and topology 
of a CIS on system resilience. Impacts are evaluated at the individual distribution 
component level and overall system level, with probabilistic analysis results that include 
interdependencies between multiple infrastructure systems. A water distribution system is 
used as an example, including the connections of the water system with power and access 
components needed for repair. The network parameters varied include the conditional 
probabilities of failure given a hazard event for power supplies, water supplies, and access 
for repair nodes; redundant power nodes that are added to service water supply nodes; and 
new links added (i.e., pipes) to the network to investigate the effects of changing network 
connectivity in protecting against system failures. Overall system vulnerability is 
compared across multiple water networks to further evaluate the impact of connectivity on 
system performance.  
A BN approach is used to conduct inferences and evaluate the resulting changes in 
marginal probabilities of component failure from the parameter variations. Results from 
the parameter variations are compared to results from the baseline network to quantify the 
changes in CIS outcomes. Impacts are also measured based on affected populations and 
critical facilities. 
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The following conclusions are drawn from the results of the probabilistic analyses. 
Adding redundant power supplies at the water supplies is the most effective in decreasing 
marginal probabilities of failure across the system. In assessing the characteristics of 
components with the largest impacts, distribution components connected to one supply 
have the largest changes in performance compared to components with multiple reachable 
supplies for all parameter variations. For one-supply components, the degree of relative 
change in marginal probabilities of failure for a component is a function of the 
characteristics of the component, including physical distance to the nearest supply node, 
number of MLSs, and minimum number of links to a supply. Components closer to a 
supply have higher relative changes than components farther away. Components with 
fewer MLSs and fewer minimum links in a MLS also show larger relative changes in 
probabilities of failure. These results indicate the types of components that are most likely 
to experience changes in expected functionality with network parameter changes. 
Exponential functions are fit to assess the relative change in component marginal 
probabilities of failure with changes in component characteristics. As a function of the 
shortest physical distance between a component and supply, the coefficient of the 
exponential fit function increases linearly as the conditional probability of failure given 
hazard increases, indicating larger predicted relative changes as the supply component 
conditional probabilities of failure increase. Increasing component-level conditional 
probabilities of failure results in larger relative changes compared to decreasing 
probabilities of failure. Introducing new links in the network can also increase resilience, 
if the links connect one-supply distribution components to multiple other supplies through 
new MLS paths. The impacts of network parameter changes are evaluated based on the 
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relative change in marginal probabilities of distribution component failure and the 
population affected in supply failure scenarios.  
Assessing the sensitivity in CIS outcomes to the varying network parameter 
changes informs CIS management decisions by facilitating prioritization of actions that 
will lead to the greatest increases in resilience. For example, results show the benefits of 
adding redundant power supplies at water supply nodes to increase CIS resilience. Results 
also indicate that it is more important to repair aged or slightly damaged components, 
which have higher conditional probabilities of failure, compared to retrofitting 
components, which may have already low failure probabilities. Locations for new system 
build-outs should be selected to increase the number of reachable supplies for distribution 
components. Knowing the characteristics of the components that experience the greatest 
impacts from network parameter changes informs a performance-based approach to design 
where decisions for system repairs or upgrades can target performance at particular 
components to increase resilience. 
Lastly, across different water networks, results show that networks that have evenly 
distributed redundancies throughout all components have the lowest overall system 
vulnerability. This occurs in networks that have at least one supply redundancy per 
component. As the average number of supplies per component increases, the average 
failure probability of all components in a network does not continue to decrease. These 
analyses again provide insights for prioritizing decisions for adding redundancies in a 
system and can characterize aspects of less vulnerable and more resilient systems.  
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7.5 Future Work 
The work in this dissertation can be extended in several ways. First, for increasing 
situational awareness through CIS monitoring capabilities, further investigation can be 
done of machine learning methods for processing social media big data, and additional 
studies can be conducted to integrate data within single sensor sources. Second, 
probabilistic system outcomes can be compared across larger water networks for a fuller 
analysis of the impact of topology on CIS vulnerability and resilience. Additional network 
parameters can also be investigated for their impacts. 
7.5.1 Additional Machine Learning Applications 
This study proposes a framework for processing and classifying social media big 
data to identify CIS damages and hazard events. The framework first filters social media 
text-based posts to reduce the amount of data for training and constructing machine 
learning-based classifiers. In applications of this framework, three well-known classifiers 
are built on manually labeled training data.  
The framework can be applied to create additional machine learning classifiers to 
compare the models’ performance and to make recommendations for the most suitable 
model for predicting damages in a specific CIS. For instance, in this study, the classifiers 
built were not generalizable to identify power system damages. Additional classifiers and 
unsupervised learning models can be built through the proposed framework. The 
performance of these new models can reveal whether the identification of such specific and 
current power system damages is feasible as a classification task.  
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7.5.2 Data Integration within Sensor Sources 
In the proposed probabilistic data integration framework, data from each source is 
integrated first before integration across data sources. Integrating data from a single sensor 
source does not assume conditional independence. Conditional independence is assumed 
for integrating data across sensor sources. In each application presented in Chapter 5, 
USGS stream gage data is integrated by creating an additional variable to combine the 
likelihood of observing data from each individual stream gage. To extend this work in data 
integration, different combinations of data likelihoods for each source can be applied to 
evaluate the impact of source likelihoods on the resulting analyses for integration across 
sources. 
For instance, for the applications presented in this dissertation, alternate 
integrations of stream gage likelihoods and the subsequent changes in results when 
integrated with other sensor sources can be investigated. Moreover, additional sensor 
sources can be added to the integration of data across sensor sources, and the impacts of 
information from a range of sensor sources can be evaluated.  
7.5.3 Impacts of Network Topology on the Resilience of Different Networks 
Finally, the impact of network topology on overall system vulnerability and 
resilience can be further assessed by varying prior probabilities of component failure in a 
single network (i.e., Atlanta water) and across more networks of different sizes and types. 
To vary the parameters of the Atlanta water network in this study, all conditional 
probabilities of failure are initially assumed as 0.01, i.e., a 1% probability of failure given 
hazard occurrence, and conclusions as changes are made to supply vulnerabilities, system 
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redundancies, and connectivity. Including variation in prior probabilities of component 
failure has potential for investigating the impacts of components that age and deteriorate 
at different rates in the system on overall system behaviour. It can also further help in 
prioritizing actions for decreasing system vulnerability. 
Moreover, in this study, eight distinct networks are evaluated with the BN model, 
and additional networks are created by varying the number of supplies in each network. 
The networks are all small-size water networks. To draw more in-depth conclusions about 
the impacts of network topology on overall CIS resilience, a wider variety of network sizes 
is needed for analysis. The same analyses can be conducted to compare the vulnerabilities 
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